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South Africa needs a modern, sophisticated telecommunications network to 
ensure economic development and political stability. The same network must also 
provide affordable and reliable service to a great percentage of the population. 
The telecommunications industry is currently monopolised by Telkom, a state-
owned business enterprise (SBE), and does not appear capable of meeting these 
basic requirements. The purpose of this paper is to present a case for restructuring 
Telkom and liberalising the telecommunications industry to best serve the needs 
of the South African economy.1 
The objective for restructuring the telecommunications industry must be to 
maximise long-term consumer welfare for all South Africans. This paper argues 
that consumer welfare will be maximised only by dismantling the statutory 
monopoly structure and moving toward a highly competitive, privately owned 
telecommunications industry. The economic issues, of course, can not be 
discussed realistically without reference to political, social and historical variables, 
all of which are also considered. By focusing primarily on economic issues, 
however, this paper strives to avoid the ideological disputes which usually 
surround discussions of state ownership. 
This paper focuses on the telecommunications industry because it represents the 
single most important infrastructural component in a modern economy. It also 
presents a unique opportunity if managed well, and a grave danger if allowed to 
continue in its current structure. 
lAithough the South African government operates parastatals in many industries, this paper focuses almost 
solely on the telecomms monopoly. The primary objective of this paper is to determine an optimal structure 
for Telkom, but an important secondary objective is to create a framework for analysing the structure of other 
SBEs. Much of the analysis of telecommunications is applicable to other industries, and may provide a useful 
basis for discussing the optimal structures for other South African SBEs. 




The relatively modern and broad-based existing telecomms network is one of 
South Africa's principal competitive advantages in the regional economy: its 
maintenance and extension is vital for future economic prosperity. Moreover, 
because the network will deteriorate and/ or become obsolete very quickly -
relative to other components of infrastructure- its optimisation must take place on 
a timely basis. The danger of obsolescence is heightened by an ongoing 
"technological transformation which entails the increasing convergence of 
telecommunications and information technologies." (Kaplan 1990, p. 14) In other 
words, rapid action is required to maintain competitive advantage. Ironically, the 
same technological transformation which heightens the risk of obsolescence also 
provides unique opportunity for creative restructuring. 
Restructuring the telecomms industry presents an opportunity to expedite South 
Africa's economic development, and to help ensure the country's transition to 
peaceful, productive democracy. Continuing with the status quo presents a dire 
threat to economic development, and can only impede the socio-political 
transition.2 
1.1 Structure of Paper 
This paper is structured to illustrate key economic issues in the general discussion 
of competition, state ownership, and privatisation, while simultaneously 
examining the issues which relate specifically to Telkom and its future. Some 
parts of the analysis are, therefore, relatively theoretical and general, while others 
focus specifically on the facts of Telkom, the telecommunications industry, and 
South Africa's political economy. 
2 A second reason for focusing this analysis on the telecomms industry is the relative difficulty of arguing for 
Telkom's privatisation. The case for privatisation is difficult because Telkom is profitable in accounting terms 
and operates in an industry which has historically had a pronounced risk of sub-optimal societal outcome in 
an environment of unrestrained competition. Privatisation of any money-losing SBE could be justified simply 
as a means to reducing government's borrowing needs. Without financial losses (as in the case of Telkom) 
this paper foregoes an easy argument for recommending privatisation. The risk of sub-optimal outcome from 
unrestrained competition has traditionally created a broad consensus that government has some legitimate 
role in the regulation and/or ownership of the telecommunications industry. This risk of "market failure" has 




Following the introduction and description of structure, Chapter I presents a brief 
history of telecommunications in South Africa and a description of Telkom's 
cqmmercialised structure. Chapter I also presents a description of Telkom's 
;a 
physical network and some of the Company's operating statistics. Finally, 
/ 
Chapter I discusses the circumstances which heighten the economic and political 
attractions of~ fundamental restructuring in the telecomms industry. 
Chapter II outlines the economic reasons (fears of market failure) which originally 
justified structuring the telecommunications industry as a statutory monopoly. 
Chapter II also examines the current applicability of the original reasoning, and 
concludes that the fears of market failure have been largely alleviated by 
technology. Finally, Chapter II outlines the negative economic consequences 
which are created by the existing state inonopoly structure, and concludes that the 
status quo has resulted in a sub-optimal outcome. 
Chapter III begins by outlining some broad goals for an optimal telecomms 
industry in South Africa, providing a benchmark for evaluating the competition-
enhanced, private-ownership structure which is presented in later chapters. 
Chapter III presents a number of specific steps which can be taken to increase 
competition in telecomms at the industry level. These steps can be undertaken 
prior to any restructuring of Telkom itself. 
Chapter IV presents steps for operational restructuring which'. Telkom must 
undergo before privatisation. Primarily this restructuring entails the division of 
Telkom into stand-alone telecomms companies, each focusing on a particular 
service or geographic region. Chapter IV also examines a variety of ownership 
structures for the separate Telkom units and presents the general economic and 
non-economic issues surrounding the transfer of Telkom ownership to private 
investors. 
role of the market). The combination of accounting profitability and market_:failure risk create a greater 





Chapter V presents a series of specific steps for effecting the privatisation of 
Telkom. Legislative and organisational issues are discussed, and a three-stage 
plan for actual share divestment is proposed. The proposal includes an ownership 
structure, rudimentary regulatory parameters and guidelines for the use of 
proceeds from the privatisation. Specific terms and conditipns for the 
privatisation of Telkom would, of course, have to be negotiated in a broad-based 
forum for stakeholders. 
Chapter VI is a brief summary and conclusion. 
1.2 History of South African Telecommunications 
Telkom's predecessor company was created in the late 19th century as a 
subsidiary of the government's postal service. Although the original telephone 
and telegraph lines were installed by private entrepreneurs, "these fledgling 
telecommunications services ... were bought by government before the tum of the 
century." In its infancy, telecommunications was seen as "an extension of the 
postal carrier's primary objective," and was considered too important to be left in 
the hands of the private sector. (Telkom 1993B, p. 4) 
Originally the postal and telecommunications services were operated directly by 
the Treasury and Commission for Administration .. The Department of Posts and 
Telecommunications (DPT) was created in the 1960s to encourage a more 
businesslike approach to the provision of these services. Until 1990 the telecomms 
monopoly was operated by the DPT, which was administered in turn by the 
Minister of Transport and Communications. DPT was a "classic post, telephone .. 
and telegraph monopoly, legally monopolising postal and telecommunications 
services." (Horwitz 1993, p. 6) 
In aggregate, the DPT was forbidden by statute from posting a net profit or loss at 
the end of each year. To prevent this, operating profits from the relatively 
lucrative telecomms service were generally used to cross-subsidise the losses 




prohibited as a goal, it would have almost certainly been superseded by the 
political objectives of DPT' s elected and appointed masters. The primary non-
m~rket objectives were: ,. 
• job creation / , 
• industrial poli~y promotion/ / 
• pr~vision of service to rural Afrikaners. 
Non-market Objectives 
A primary goal of South African SBEs was to provide jobs for "hundreds of 
thousands of landless, poor Afrikaners who had left farming," (Horwitz 1992, p. 
299) and were unable to find work in the industrial sector. Although DPT was not 
the primary source of jobs and patronage for Afrikaner voters, this function was 
undoubtedly important for the Department's overseers in Parliament. (Horwitz 
1993 IP· 8) 
DPT was also an important tool of the government's industrial policy, as it "played 
a major role in the development and support of the local electronics industry." 
(Telkom 1993, p. 9) The support of local industry was effected primarily through 
a series of long-term agreements (called Manufacture and Supply Agreements, or 
MSAs) to purchase equipment from a small number of domestic suppliers. These 
MSAs, which were first introduced in 1958 and did not expire until 1995, 
guarantee comfortable profit margins to the favoured suppliers and have greatly · 
subsidised the development of the South African electronics industry.3 
In addition to the job-creation and industrial-policy goals, DPT also pursued 
politically important operational goals. These goals included: maintenance of low 
prices for plain old telephone service (POTS) and extension of that service to as 
many white-owned households as possible. In fact, service to rural areas was 
"virtually limited to white-owned farms," anq was "heavily subsidised ... because 
of political influences." (Telkom 1993B, p. 36) 
3 A thorough analysis of MSAs and their role in the development of the South African electronics industry is 




DPT's success in keeping basic service prices low was evidenced in a 1985 study, 
which calculated South African phone service as the 8th-least expensive of 34. 
countries surveyed. The drive for universal service for whites was also highly 
successful: in 1987 there were 83.9 telephones in service for every 100 white-
owned residences (Horwitz 1993, p. 16), a penetration ratio comparable "to that of 
the populations of many industrialised countries." (Kaplan 1990, p. 52) 
Penetration amongst black population groups was, and continues to be, 
substantially lower. 
Adherence to these non-market objectives has created major distortions in the 
natural development of Telkom's network. These distortions persist to this day, 
and are likely to present a major challenge for Telkom (or its privatised successors) 
and competitors in future years. 
1.3 Commercialisation 
Under the old South African political order, and in the context of early telecomms 
technology, the monopoly structure of DPT was considered adequate for meeting 
the government's goals. For many years DPT provided inexpensive telecomms · 
and postal services for voters (i.e., whites) and relatively modern and efficient 
telecomms infrastructure for formal-sector (i.e., white-owned) businesses. 
In the late 1980s a variety of Eolitical, economic and technological chang.e.s_ 
-...Pressured g~rnment to re-evaluate the DPT organisational ~J:e .. 





' ....... . .:-:--. 
• a residual Department of Posts and Telecommunications, which is 
responsible for regulating the communications industries; 
• the postal service; 
• and the telecommunications monopoly, which was "commercialised" 
and renamed Telkom SA Limited. 
The commercialised telephone company was established to free it "from the 




"financial and political goals imposed by government." (Telkom 1994, p. 1) 
Telkom's mission statement reads: 
"We are dedicated to being South Africa's leading and most respected 
provider of excellent telecommunications services and products that 
satisfy the needs of our clients whilst fulfilling our social responsibility 
and maintaining a sound financial structure." (Telkom 1994, p. 1) 
Although Telkom cites the goal of its commercialisation as an attempt to make it 
"more efficient and productive," commercialisation is generally seen as an 
intermediate step before privatising any given SBE. If privatisation were the 
ultimate goal, the purpose of commercialisation is "to separate enterprise activities 
and decision making from the traditional bureaucratic hierarchy of political 
administration." (OECD 1993A, p. 14) Commercialisation also creates distinct 
financial results for an enterprise, which are meant to become the basis for 
investor valuations at a later date. 
Despite occasional proclamations to the contrary (see Ryan 1993), it was not 
politically feasible for the minority South African government to carry out the 
privatisation of Telkom unilaterally. Prior to entering government, the ANC 
announced that 
"although it was no longer wed to nationalisation as a matter of general 
policy, public sector corporations and parastatals that were privatised 
prior to political accommodation would be prime candidates for 
(re)nationalisation. "(Horwitz ~992B, p. 302) 
This announcement was intended specifically to forestall the planned privatisation 
of Telkom, and was a response to the widely held belief that the purpose of 
privatisation was "to take the parastatals out of the hands of the black majority 
come a democratic dispensation."(Horwitz 1993, p. 12) 
In the first thirteen months of the Mandela presidency, there have been no official 






Recently, however, the President and certain cabinet members have begun 
discussing privatisation as a means to reduce the governmenf s borrowing 
requirements. (Keller 1994, page AlO) 
1.4 Description of Telkom and its Operations 
With annual turnover of R8.4 billion, and total assets of RlS.4 billion, Telkom is a 
very large organisation by any standard. The Company employs 60,172 people, 
having reduced head count by almost 8,000 since commercialisation. (Telkom 
1994, pp. 8-12) 
Company Structure 4: 
Telkom is an omnibus provider of telecommunications services in South Africa, 
with a statutory monopoly in virtually all sectors of the industry. The Company's 
businesses include: 
• long-distance dialing services (LOOS) 
• local telephone service 
• value-added voice services 
• telematics (Saponet, Diginet) 
• value-added networks (Beltel, Easy Access) 
• telex and teletex 
• cellular communications 
• marine radio 
• research & development (through the Telecommunications 
Development Institute) 
Telkom' s organisational structure is a semi-matrix form, with responsibilities 
allocated primarily by function. Within the operations division, however, 
management responsibility is divided on geographic lines. Figure 1 is a simplified 
diagram of Telkom's organisational structure. 
4 Description of Telkom's corporate structure is summarised from Telkom Annual Reports (1993A) and (1994) 




Figure 1: ORGANISATIONAL CHART 
I Telkom I Board of Directors -. 
• I 
I Telkom I Managing Director 
I 
I Operations 11 Technology I I Marketing 11 Human Resources I I Finance I !Strategy and lnformatiorf 
I 
IProvinciaVRegionat • Operations I 
Source: Telkom 19938 
Operating control 
In recent years, Telkom has devolved considerable decision-making power in 
operations to its six regional divisions. The divisions provide the bulk of the 
network's services, and regional line managers "have the responsibility of running 
and being accountable for their own operations." (Telkom 1993B, p. 10) At the 
regional level, the units are organised along functional lines, including network 
control, long-distance and international services, and telematics. 
Telkom's head office provides centralised support functions (finance, human, 
resources, technology, marketing), and retains control over all strategic decisions. 
The major centralised divisions are: 
• Technology: plans and implements technological improvements to the · 
·network, and executes Telkom's research and development function. 
• Marketing: caters to the interests of commercial and residential 
customers, and develops public phones and other services. 
• . Human Resources (HR): hires and trains Telkom employees, and 
assigns them to tasks within the divisions and sub-divisions of the 
Company. HR also handles labour relations and contract negotiations. 
• Finance: maintains the accounts and manages Telkom's Treasury and 
procurement functions. 
• Strategy & Information: plans the future strategic direction of the 
Company, and manages communications with the government and 
other stakeholders. 
Statistical Measures 
The telecommunications system currently managed by Telkom is impressive in 




continent, measuring approximately 100 million circuit kilometres, 80% of which 
are digital. (Telkom 1993A) The network provides 3.5 million access lines, which 
makes it the 25th largest in the world. (Horwitz 1993, p. 16) The South African 
network is connected to the rest of the world via analogue and digital submarine 
cables and satellite link, and is sophisticated enough to allow for 98.5% of the 35 
million annual overseas calls to be dialed directly. (Telkom 1993A) 
Quality of Service 
By most statistical measures, the quality of Telkom's service is considered 
reasonably good. The percentage of calls answered averages just over 60%, which 
"compares favourably with the service quality of other major international 
telecommunications companies." (Telkom 1993A, p. 29) The speed of fault 
clearance, 77% within one working day, is also considered "near to the level of 
industrialised countries." (Horwitz 1993, p. 19) 
Service Complaints 
Despite the quality of service as quantified above, tl,t.ere is broad customer 
dissatisfaction with Telkom's current service level. Telkom management 
acknowledges this problem: "The single biggest perception of Telkom among the 
public is that service is abysmal." (Telkom 1993B) This dissatisfaction is very 
broad~based, exhibited by existing commercial and residential customers as well 
as by the vast numbers of South Africans who have been unable to even subscribe 
to the network. 
fsusiness users are particularly dissatisfied with the very slow introduction of 
value-added network services (VANS), such as call-waiting and call-forwarding, 
data transmission and voice mail. Customers are also frustrated by the 
unavailability of itemised billing and a perceived lack of responsiveness to 
complaints. Non-subscribers are highly dissatisfied with the long waiting periods 
for connection and the complete lack of service availability in many areas. Telkom 
claims to be making great progress in these areas, but still only 50% of the orders 
for service connection are filled within one month, and only 90% within three 




Subjective perceptions of low productivity and inefficiency at Telkom are borne 
out by the low number of access lines in service per employee, a standard measure 
of ~telecommunications productivity. As Table 1 indicates, Telkom's lines per 
. a 
employee compares poorly to countries such as South Korea, the United States, 
and even Mexico 
Table 1: TELECOMMS PRODUCTIVITY BY COUNTRY 
Country/Company Lines per Employee 
Japan (NTI) 236 
United States (RBOCs) 231 
South Korea 226 
France (Telecom) 199 
British Telecom 171 
Deutsche Telekom 160 
Mexico (Telmex) 96 






Telkom (1993),Horwitz (1993), p, 8 
Durchslag & Puri (1993) 
Additional Difficulties 
More important than the current complaints about Telkom's service and low 
penetration, it appears that the Company is not equipped to rectify its 
fundamental problems in the foreseeable future. Telkom has been starved of 
investment capital for many years, both under its old DPT structure and under the 
post-1990 commercialised structure. Between 1988 and 1991, capital expenditure 
on telecommunications decreased 42% in nominal terms, with no plan to increase 
spending until 1995 at the earliest. (Telkom 1993B, p. 32) 
Telkom's capital expenditure budget is limited by its statutory obligation to 
continue subsidising postal service until 1996, and by its requirements to return 
profits to government. In 1994, government took R483 million in taxes and 




million gross capital expenditure in 1995. (Telkom 1994, p. 40) By way of 
illustration, it has been estimated that it would cost at least Rl 1.5 billion to install 
a~ additional 10 million phone lines in South Africa. (Li and Li 1995, p. 11) At 
• 
current investment rates (ignoring depreciation), capital expenditures totaling 
Rl 1.5 billion will not be invested until the year 2010. 
Compounding the lack-of-capital problem, Telkom has stated the objective of 
reducing its debt/equity ratio to 1.lx by 1998 (from 1.Bx in 1994). (Telkom 1994, p. 
33) TNs planned deleveraging prevents Telkom from financing its necessary 
capital expenditures with new debt. 
A number of Telkom-specific factors further compound the problem of low capital 
expenditure. Specifically, the productivity of capital investment has been reduced 
by the following 5: 
• prohibitive tariff and non-tariff barriers on imported 
telecommunications equipment, which drives up the prices of domestic 
equipment; 
• long-term domestic supplier ~elationships which helped build the local 
electronics industry but did not provide lowest-cost inputs; 
• extremely restrictive agreements with labour, which prohibit 
management from retrenching employees as part of the post-
commercialisa ti on restructuring; 
• continuing politicisation of the Company's goals and objectives; 
• uncertainty about future ownership and structure. 
1.5 Need and Opportunity for Restructuring 
If Telkom were organised efficiently and capitalised adequately, the maintenance 
and extension of the network would help to lead South Africa into sustainable 
economic prosperity and development. Moreover, telecommunications plays: 
"an indispensable role in promoting opennenss, accessibility, democracy, 
decentralisation -all of the "soft" qualities essential to effective social, 
economic and political development." (Pitroda 1993) 
Conversely, if the infrastructure controlled by Telkom is not extended and 
improved, or is allowed to deteriorate significantly, hopes for sustainable real 




economic growth in South Africa become less probable. As Telkom management 
describes it: 
"Countries that fail to keep pace with advances in telecommunications 
could quickly become technologically obsolete and, isolated from 
lucrative world markets, destined to poverty." (Telkom 1993B, p. 36) 
Under normal circumstances, a proposal to radically change the structure and 
ownership of a major infrastructural asset would be strictly an academic exercise, 
with little hope of policy effect. Current circumstances in South Africa, however, 
are far from normal. Two simultaneous, but independent, transformations 
indicate that a privatisation of Telkom could be effected in the near future. These 
two transformations are: 
• South Africa's political transition 
• the global trend toward reduced government interference in markets, as 
manifested by deregulation of industry and privatisation of state-owned 
companies. 
Political Transition 
The first source of opportunity is South Africa's tumultuous grand transition from 
rulership by a white minority to full democracy. A fortunate byproduct of this 
change is that the fundamental structures of the South African political economy 
are being questioned, and that the merits of various organisational principles are 
being debated seriously by new and old policy makers. To some, the greater 
transition period presents an opportunity to evaluate and optimise the economic 
role of the government, and to create an efficient system of political and economic 
organisation for South Africa's future. 
In the latter half of the 1980s, the South African minority government began 
unilaterally reducing its presence in the economy. "Retrenchment of state 
intervention" included the commercialisation and privatisation of some SBEs, and 
included plans for privatising many more. After negotiations toward a fully 
democratic political system were begun in 1990, the privatisation process was 




legacy of the apartheid system, however, it seems virtually inevitable that they 
will be restructured in some way during the greater political transition. 
Ade.mg to the great pressure for restructuring is government's need to obtain and 
invest capital to improve the living standards of South Africa's poorest citizens. 
-· 
Privatisation of state-owned assets is frequently discussed as a potential source for 
this capital. 
Specifically relating to Telkom, reform of the telecomms industry is seen by many 
as a crucial building block of a new democracy. 
"Telecommunications was as critical to nation building as water, 
agriculture, health and housing, and without it ... democracy could 
founder." (Pitroda 1993, p. 68) 
Global Privatisation Boom 
Quite separate from the political and economic transition in South Africa, a global 
re-evaluation of the relationship between governments and markets has been in 
progress for the last 15 years. A wide variety of economic, social and political 
factors have caused nations in all geographic regions and at all stages of economic 
development to examine the structures of their economies. Based on internal re-
assessments, many governments have embarked upon programmes to reduce the 
level of their own intervention in their economies. These programmes are usually 
characterised by deregul".ltion o·f industries, liberalisation of international trade, 
and the privatisation of state-owned business enterprises. 
Globally, between 1985 and 1994, SBEs worth a total of $328 billion were sold to 
investors, using a wide variety of privatisation techniques. In 1992 alone, SBEs 
worth $69 billion were privatised in 50 different countries. (Economist 1993) 
Although privatisation was originally considered appropriate only for advanced 
industrialised economies, privatisation programmes have been implemented 
successfully in nations at all stages of economic development. Privatisations have 




Telegraph to nominal (or negative) prices paid for companies in Eastern Europe 
and Africa. 
The sweeping political change in South Africa and the global re-consideration of 
the appropriate role for government .in the economy combine to present a unique 
opportunity in South Africa. The new South African government has the power to 
determine the optimal structure of South African parastatals in general. 
Specifically, the government can unlock the political and economic power of a 
deregulated, technologically sophisticated telecomms network. 
1.6 Conclusion 
Both in the national and global contexts, South Africa's SBEs are due for a 
comprehensive re-consideration of their organisational structures. Telkom 
represents a unique opportunity for the new South African government to 
optimise its relationship with an industry which provides a crucial component of 
infrastructure. 
By restructuring the telecomms industry for maximum competition, and by 
privatising Telkom to improve its efficiency and its beneficial reach, the 
government can materially improve the lives of its citizens. Also, the government 
can send a strong signal to its constituents, and to the world, that it is pursuing 
economically rational, creative strategies to encourage economic development. · 




II. STATE MONOPOLY IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
2.0 Iutroduction 
Chapter II examines the economics of Telkom's state-monopoly structure, and 
./ 
draws conclusions about its effects on the efficiency and sophistication of 
telecomms in South Africa. 
State ownership can be justified economically by its ability to ameliorate market 
failures -in this case natural monopoly and demand economies of scale. Section 
2.1 examines these market failures in the context of a telecommunications 
company, particularly at the time when the state-monopoly structure was created 
and developed. 
Section 2.2 evaluates the applicability of these market-failure fears in the current 
technological environment. Specifically, Section 2.2 examines the technological 
means to ameliorate market failures, and determines that the state-monopolisation 
of the telecomms industry is unnecessary-at best. 
I 
Section 2.3 examines the negative economic consequences engendered by the state 
monopoly of telecomms services. Specifically, Section 2.3 discusses the allocative 
and "x-" inefficiencies and lack of technological innovation which characterise the 
existing SBE structure. Section 2.4 concludes the chapter. 
2.1 Economic Arguments for State Monopoly Structure 









Partially Wholly Privately Owned 
PrivatisedPrivatisedand Competitive 
Monopoly Monopoly 
Government intervention in any industry takes a variety of forms, ranging from 
complete laisser-faire to government ownership of a monopoly supplier of goods 
or services. Any degree of government intervention can be legitimised by 
. ,. . ... -·. 
··' . 
, .... , .... ~-; .• - ..•. ·- ~ .. . . . 




economic arguments in two broad areas: amelioration of product-market failure, 
particularly natural monopoly and externalities; and alleviation of income 
in~quality. Political arguments for government intervention are also frequently 
;a 
expressed by policy makers, but an analysis of these is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
Although income inequality was, and continues to be, a serious problem in South 
Africa, government involvement in telecomms was explicitly not initiated to 
alleviate that condition. Beginning in the late 19th century, South African policy 
makers were motivated by the fear that a competitive market would fail to result 
in an optimal output of telecomms services. Specifically, the government 
,· 
recognised the "inability of telecommunications pioneers to fund the capital 
expenditures needed." (Telkom 1993B, p. 5) The private sector's perceived 
inability to fund the large fixed costs of a telecomms network was compounded by 
the high risk of embarking on such a project. 
More important than lack of capital, government recognised the "strategic 
importance" of telecomms, and could not depend on the market to establish the 
type of network it saw as necessary. This was an implicit recognition of the risks 
of market failure in the telecomms industry. On the basis of these arguments, 
government officials chose to structure the industry as a state monopoly. 
The remainder of Section 2.1 examines the economic arguments which have been 
used to legitimise state monopolisation of the telecomms industry. Sections 2.2 to 
2.4 focus on the applicability of the legitimising arguments in today's world, and 
the negative economic consequences of continuing state ownership. 




The parastatal structure m tele~omms is designed to prevent two general 
categories of market failure: the consequences of natural monopoly and the 
inability of private suppliers to capture the societal benefits (positive externalities) 
which are derived from operating the telecommunications network. In an 
unregulated market environment, both of these market failures could result in a 
systematic undersupply of telecommunications services and a distorted allocation 
of resources for society as a whole. 
To prevent a socially sub-optimal result, the government determines price and 
supply by fiat, rather than allowing market forces to reign. In the early days of 
telecommunications, the decision of the South African government to structure the 
industry this way is quite defensible. 7 
Section 2.la - Market Failure #1: Natural Monopoly 
Telecommunications has traditionally been considered a natural monopoly 
industry for two reasons: 
1. The physical nature of the network creates economies of scale for 
incumbent firms and presents barriers to entry (including high exit 
costs) for potential competitors; and 
2. telecommunications does not have any close substitutes in other 
industries. 
Fixed Costs and Economies of Scale 
The act of telecommunication (except cellular and radio) requires that users be 
physically connected to each other by a system of cables and exchanges. This 
network requires substantial investment in switching equipment (exchanges), 
transmission facilities (wire or optical fibre lines) and terminals (subscriber 
6 It must be noted that market failures in telecomms do not extend to the manufacture of telecomms 
equipment, particularly the mass-market production of end-user equipment. There are no legitimate 
economic arguments based on market failure which can be used to justify statutory monopoly or state 
ownership of these manufacturing functions. In Telkom's case, the Company has frequently granted sole 
rights to manufacture specific equipment for the network. Aside from industrial policy (discussed in Section 
2.1(c), there is no economic defense for these exclusive arrangements. 
7 An alternative to state ownership was the creation of a highly regulated, privately owned telecomms 




equipment). The need for up-front investment creates sharply decreasing average 
costs: marginal costs per call are practically zero, and the fixed costs of the 
ne~twork are allocated to an increasing number of calls. In an unregulated market 
• 
the competitive advantage in cost for an incumbent telecomms service provider is . 
/ 
a sustainable and effective barrier to entry. 
Exit Costs 
Telecommunications assets are highly site-specific and task-specific, and would be 
of little value to businesses which were not directly competing in the telecomms 
market in which the equipment is installed. These high exit costs, which increase 
the risk of investment in a competing telecomms venture, heighten the barriers to 
entry. 
Lack of Substitutes 
Even in an industry which has a single competitor and high barriers to entry, 
contestability could possibly be maintained by the presence of close substitutes 
from other industries. High cross-elasticity of demand acts as an effective check 
on monopoly power, since consumers will simply purchase substitutes for the 
monopolised good or service. 
In the case of telecommunications, no close substitutes have been readily available 
until recently, and cross-elasticity of demand remains1ow. Consumers have long 
judged telegraph and telex services to be inferior, and wireless communication 
technologies have only become widely available in the last ·ten years. Wireless 
communication continues to be relatively expensive, and continues to be reliant 
upon the traditional telecomms network for completion of calls. 
Consequences of Natural Monopoly 
The barriers to entry and the lack of close substitutes from other industries 
support an industry structure of natural monopoly. (Oster, 1994, pp. 55-59) The 
allocative inefficiency of monopolisation (without first-degree discriminatory 





pricing) has been well documented, but is primarily characterised by prices which 
are higher, and output which is lower, than those observed in a competitive 
structure. 
"The achievement of allocative efficiency requires that the prices paid by 
consumers ... should cover, at the margin, the opportunity costs to society 
of resources used as inputs to production." (Floyd 1984, p. 17) 
In telecomms, the government expected an unregulated market to result in 
equilibrium pricing well above marginal cost, and a sub-optimal level of 
production. 8 
State Ownership as Remedy 9 
Many governments have attempted to ameliorate the social inefficiencies of 
natural monopolies in telecomms by creating state-owned companies. State 
ownership was thought to "ensure economically or politically desired prices [and 
output] and at the same time guarantee the reliability of supply." (Bos 1991, p. 8) 
Rather than relying on market forces to allocate the supply of telecommunications 
services, it was believed that the government could determine an optimal output 
level and price using positive analysis. By fiat, state-owned company could then 
be "given explicit assignments to follow a behaviour that should lead to a Pareto 
optimum." (Bos 1981, p. 19) 
In telecommunications this societal optimum was generally interpreted as "a 
mandate to expand service universally and generally to keep basic prices low." 
(Horwitz 1992, p. 5) In other words, the state monopoly could dictate pricing 
which approximated marginal cost, and could increase service levels to a 
perceived societal optimum.JO This is in contrast to a private-sector monopoly, 
8 Monopolisation of a major industry also has significant distributive consequences. Regardless of the size of 
the dead weight loss from monopoly, excess profits will accrue to the owners of the monopoly rights. 
9 State ownership has failed abjectly in the modern era to reduce the adverse effects of natural monopoly. 
This failure is discussed at length in Section 2.3. 
10 A very clever (and well-informed) government could approximate a second-best solution by taxing the sale 
of non-monopolised goods and services in the economy. If the tax-induced premium to marginal cost in 
competitive goods were roughly equal in percentage terms to the rents earned by the natural monopolist, 
distortion would be minimised. A second-best solution based on equivalent taxation would be extremely 




which would be expected to set higher prices for lower output levels. In the event, 
for white South Africans this is exactly what the DPT was able to do under the 
or!ginal state monopoly structure. 
"' 
In addition to determining optimal prices and output levels, the monopoly .... " 
structure could be used to "solve the problem of standards, interconnection, and 
easy access to capital." (Horwitz, 1992, p. 5) 
Particularly with regard to standards, the need for technological compatibility in 
telecomms creates the potential for wasted resources. 
"When preferences differ ... each party will promote as the standard the 
technology that maximises its own private benefits, not the technology 
that maximises benefits for society at large." (Besen & Saloner 1988, p. 180) 
Agreement on technological standards reduces the likelihood that infrastructure 
will be duplicated by non-compatible ~etworks. 11 As a monopsonistic purchaser 
of telecomms hardware, the state has the market power to insist on consistent 
standards and complete compatibility of equipment from all of its suppliers. 
Section 2.lb - Market Failure #2: Demand Economies of Scale 
The nature of a telecommunications network dictates that demand economies of 
scale will arise as additional consumers subscribe to telephone service. By 
attaching to the network, a new subscriber increases his or her own utility 
(presumably by more utility units than any similarly priced consumption 
opportunity). In addition, the expansion of the network by one subscriber 
increases marginally the utility of all incumbent subscribers, since their 
opportunities for telecommunication have been increased. On a decentralised (i.e., 
individual decision making) basis, in an environment with non-zero transaction 
costs, the positive externality generated by an additional subscriber goes unpriced 
and uncompensated. 
11 In some circumstances competing suppliers will collaborate and set industry standards, but this 'solution is 
by no means guaranteed in a competitive environment. 
,. 




Although telecommunications have some of the characteristics of private goods, 
particularly the power to exclude non-payers from most services, the network 
itself creates a public good. At its simplest level, the public good aspect is 
explained by observing the smallest possible number of subscribers which would 
constitute a network, (i.e., one telephone). 
A single-telephone network is of no use, since the lone subscriber would have no 
one to call. Extending the network to a marginal subscriber inherently increases 
the value received by the incumbent subscriber. Each additional subscriber 
receives the individual-level (or household-level or firm-level) benefits of being 
connected, but also creates an incremental benefit for each of the existing 
subscribers. This incremental value of a marginal subscriber decreases in 
importance as the network reaches high levels of penetration, but at the inception 
of telecomms service (when industry-structure decisions were taken) it had 
material economic importance. 
A straightforward example of the public-goods quality of telecomms network is 
the contribution of such a network to national security, the archetypal public 
good. By serving as a vital link between state and citizenry, and between citizens, 
the network is of great value in responding to natural disasters and the threat of 
military conflict from without or within. This "national security'' argument was 
considered especially relevant for extending service to geographically isolated 
white farmers during the minority rule of white South Africans. 
Cream.skimming 
The supply-side manifestation of this market failure is the risk that service 
providers in a competitive environment will engage in "creamskimming," or 
serving only the most lucrative markets. Areas which do not offer much profit 
potential (either due to low population density ·or low income) may not receive 
telecomms service, although society as a whole would benefit from higher 
penetration. "In other words, the likelihood of market failure ... is high." (Horwitz 
1992, p. 3) 
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Assuming that a democratic government is strictly meant to represent the interests 
of society as a whole, a government-owned telecommunications company could 
capture the benefits of demand economies of scale. By calculating the social 
benefits of the network, a service-penetration level would be determined by 
government and would justify the provision of services above and beyond what 
subscribers would be willing to buy on a disaggregated basis. In other words, 
"Direct state control ... entailed a mandate to expand service universally and 
generally to keep basic prices low." (Horwitz 1992, p. 5) State ownership also 
removed the risk of creamskimming, since the government would dictate service 
levels based on perceived societal benefit, rather than on profitability from serving 
particular districts. 
If it is accepted that a high-penetration network is a socially beneficial goal, the 
state can easily be seen as the logical creator of that network. The state's ability to 
capture societal benefit, its ,low cost of capital, and its ability to withstand 
investment risk, make the state monopoly of telecomms services even more 
defensible. The unsophisticated telecomms technology which existed at the time 
DPT was created heightened the risk of these market failures, and therefore 
increased the justification for state monopoly. 
Section 2.lc - Market Failure #3: Industrial Policy 
A possible sub-set of the positive externalities created by a telecomms network 
includes economic development through industrial policy. Government-led 
industrial policy is clearly facilitated by state ownership of infrastructural assets. 
Unlike other examples of market failure, however, there is no consensus amongst 
economists as to the effectiveness of such industrial policies. In other words, the 
actual broad developmental impact (positive or negative) of industrial policy is 
indeterminate. 
In the absence of tariffs, quotas or other government intervention, profit-




the least expensive suppliers. Unregulated telecomms companies would make 
decisions with little regard for developing local industry. A government which is · 
seeking to develop its domestic electronics industry employs the monopsony 
powers of centralised purchasing, and can dictate the pace and direction of 
technological development by fiat. DPT used the Manufacture and Supply 
Agreements discussed in Chapter II as a "purposeful state policies to encourage 
the development of a local telecommunications industry." (Kaplan 1990, p. 27) 
If the infant domestic electronics industry is able to mature and compete 
internationally due to the policy of local sourcing by the state-owned telecomms 
monopoly, society may derive considerable long-term benefits.12 Clearly the 
shareholders in the chosen electronics companies derive substantial economic 
profits, both from subsidised research and development and from non-
competitive pricing. 
Summary of Market Failures 
At the time DPT (then the Treasury and Commission for Administration) entered 
the telecommunications industry, the fears of market failure from natural 
monopoly and unpriced positive externalities were quite legitimate from at least 
four perspectives: 
• Early telecomms technology (dedicated and wire-based) dictated the 
inevitability of a single dominant network (natural monopoly) as the 
long-run industry structure. 
• Billing methods were not sufficiently sophisticated to allow for 
discriminatory pricing, which would have mitigated some of the 
negative effects of monopoly. 
• The effect of demand economies of scale was relatively important, 
creating systematic undersupply in a competitive industry structure. 
• Very high capital investment costs and extreme uncertainty created by 
product/technology risk and market risk (no market existed at the time) 
made it likely that no private-sector companies would undertake the 
construction of a broad-based network. 
12 Regardless of the success or failure of an industrial policy, society bears heavy costs for its implementation. 
These costs generally take the form of higher-than-competitive prices, relatively poor quality, and/ or retarded 




Therefore, under the existing circumstances, a state-monopoly structure appeared 
to be both reasonable and efficient. With the exception of the United States (which 
crea_ted a highly regulated, private-sector-led industry structure), virtually all 
;a 
countries developed their telecomms industries within the confines of a state 
monopoly structure. 
2.2 Applicability of_ Current Technology to Market Failures 13 
More than nine decades have intervened since the decision was made to structure 
. South Africa's telecomms industry as a state monopoly. In that period, telecomms 
technology has advanced so much as to make those early fears largely irrelevant. 
'In the last fifteen years, particularly, the advent of digitisation and 
computerisation, and the widespread use of optical fibre have alleviated the 
market failures which were previously inhet~nt in the telecommunications 
industry. Technology has wrought changes in at last the following areas: 
• open-access networks 
• ability to discriminate in price 
• substitutes for traditional network telecommunications 
The judicious application of technology to South Africa's telecomms infrastructure 
will make significant competition possible in the near term. 
Open-Access Networks 
The most important technological change in terms of market failure has been the 
development of open-access networks. This means that it has become 
economically feasible for many service providers to share access to long-distance 
13 The following'technology-based argument is undeniably.made from a developed-economy perspective. In 
South Africa, which does not even have a fully digitized phone network and continues to use copper cabling, 
some of the technological progress will not be available for many years. Nevertheless, the technologies are 
economically feasible in many developed and developing countries, and can be expected to fall further in 




phone lines while maintaining their switching equipment separately.14 This 
creates competition where none was previously possible. 
~. 
"The idea of open-access networks was developed by American 
economists during the 1970s. Under this approach the physical 
infrastructures of the networks remain regulated monopolies. Access to 
these networks is opened such that the remaining elements can be 
submitted·to competition." (Horwitz, 1992, p. 3) 
Although open-access network technology was developed to facilitate the sharing 
of long-distance lines, it is being extended to create competitive possibilities in . 
local phone service as well. According to a vice-president at Pacific Bell, a major 
U.S. telecommunications company, "There is no technological reason that 
complete competition can not exist in local telephone service." (Sherman 1993) In 
fact, as of 1January1995 Pacific Bell reduced its local tariffs by 40% in response to 
price competition by new entrants, including MCI. .Telephone subscribers in the 
U.S., the U.K., New Zealand, and (in the near future) in Germany, are able to 
choose their telecommunications provi~ers. (Economist 1993b, p.62) 
Price Discrimination 
Metering and billing technology has afforded service providers with the ability to 
engage in substantial price discrimination among consumers. As noted briefly in 
Section 2.l(a), first-degree price discrimination by a monopoly supplier creates a 
price and output equilibrium identical to that of a competitive industry structure, 
although the distributive consequences are acute. Although it provides an 
economically efficient solution, price discrimination results in the transfer of all 
consumers' welfare gains to the monopolist. The distributive consequences of this 
transfer continue to make the natural monopoly highly detrimental to South 
Africa's economy. Therefore an improved ability to discriminate in price reduces 
some of the efficiency risk of vestigial natural monopoly, but will exacerbate the 
income inequality problems already facing South Africa. 
14Under this structure, the need for technological standards as described in Section 2.l(a) is a crucial element. 
The computer hardware industry has demonstrated, however, that competing private companies can and are 





Second- and third-degree price discrimination are greatly facilitated by 
technological innovation and by the nature of telecomms services. First, it is very 
difficult to resell the perishable and specific services provided by 
telecommunication, and there is little scope for arbitrage between different user 
groups. Second, telecomms providers are generally able to distinguish between 
user types (and their willingness to pay) With digital switching and billing, 
consumers can be differentiated by the time of their usage, total service volume 
purchased, geography, household income, and many other factors. Effective price 
discrimination in telecomms usually takes the form of peak and off-peak pricing 
(multi-part tariffs), which increase capacity utilisation and more closely 
approximate a competitive equilibrium. 
Technology-based price discrimination mitigates some of the efficiency 
consequences from monopoly power which remains present in telecomms 
markets. As noted above, however, price discrimination is not a solution to all of 
the problems of natural monopoly. The distributive consequences (transfer of 
gain to the monopolist) are acute, and are not likely to be tolerated indefinitely in 
a democratic society. 
Substitutes for Traditional Telecommunications 
In addition to the changes within the telecomms industry as it has been 
traditionally defined, technological improvements have created a number of close 
substitutes (and complements) from outside the industry. 
The advent of cellular telephony and other wireless data communications 
technologies (pagers, personal digital assistants, personal computers) have 
reduced dependence on network-based telecommunication. Moreover, the 
imminent merger of digital telecomms systems and cable television systems 
provides scope for additional competition in both industries.15 Finally, continuing 
frequently able to agree on industry standards when such standards are to general benefit. This phenomenon 
is most evident in the emergence of open-standards coll1puting. (Mcl<insey, 1991, p. 10). 
15 McI<insey & Co., the management consultancy, describes this competitive environment in 




improvements in computer hardware and user-interface software are increasing 
the ease with which consumers can choose the most attractive means of receiving 
and transmitting information. 
As noted in Section 2.l(a), increased cross-elasticity of demand reduces the risk of 
monopolists taking excess profits. The ever-increasing availability of these 
substitutes further reduce the remaining monopoly power of telecomms service 
providers. 
Summary of technology 
Due to technological advancement, the traditional concerns about natural 
monopoly and unpriced externalities in telecomms are no longer warranted. In 
fact, the entire economic paradigm of telecommunications as a discrete and unique 
industry is rapidly becoming obsolete. The trends toward greater competition and 
greater ability to capture total benefit to society are likely to continue as 
technology continues to improve and is dissipated across the globe. 
Since technology has largely obviated the fears of market failure, it can be argued 
that the state-ownership structure is, at best, unnecessary. The harms which the 
state monopoly was designed to protect against are no longer relevant, and no 
new dangers of the free market have emerged to replace them. Moreover, to the 
extent that dangers of market failure persist, examples from other countries 
(including the U.K. and U.S.) have demonstrated that regulation of a private 
telecomms industry is at least as effective in promoting social goals as is direct 
ownership by the state. 
Section 2.3 goes further to illustrate that the consequences of the SBE structure are 
much worse than simply utility-neutral. In fact, the SBE structure causes 
significant harm to the telecomms industry, to the South African economy, and to 




2.3 Economic Consequences of State Monopoly 
Despite the economic good intentions of DPT /Telkom' s founders, a persuasive 
bo_dy of literature exists which catalogues the economic harm caused by the state-
• 
monopoly structure. 
"For lack of a better term, we might call them bureaucratic failures, ... 
because of the lack of market-based information and incentives. [State 
monopolisation] had engendered many unwanted outcomes, including 
sheltered inefficiency, the suppression of innovation, and misallocation of 
resources." (Horwi~ 1992, p. 6) 
The economic problems fall into three main categories: economic inefficiency 
(including both allocative inefficiency and "X" inefficiency) the stifled of 
technological innovation, and a broad variety of problems caused by mis-
alignment of the goals of principals (citizens) and agents (Telkom management). 
2.3 (a) - Allocative Inefficiency 
In economics it is widely accepted that resources are allocated efficiently only 
when no one could be made better off without making at least one person worse 
off. This condition of Pareto efficiency can only be achieved by setting prices 
equal to marginal costs across the economy. (Bos, 1991, p. 143; Black, 1992, p.6) In 
an economy of perfectly competitive industries and factor markets, marginal cost 
pricing ·would be the equilibrium outcome, and would represent a societally 
efficient allocation of resources. 
Under the existing monopoly structure, Telkom makes no systematic attempt ~o 
equate marginal costs with prices. Therefore, allocative inefficiency is inherently 
exacerbated. The allocative inefficiency is manifested as a deadweight loss to the 
economy, meaning that total consumer welfare could be increased if resources 
were allocated to telecomms on a basis which approximated marginal cost. 
Note that the problem of allocative inefficiency is inherent to monopoly, but is not 
necessarily related to state ownership. As noted in Section 2.l(a), under natural 
monopoly conditions, a profit-maximising corporation would produce telecomms 
services at a societally sub-optimal, deadweight-loss-producing level as well. In 




fact, the ability to expand output by fiat (and thereby diminish deadweight loss) is 
a crucial argument for the legitimacy of state ownership. It is ironic, then, that 
although the allocative inefficiency of monopoly is crucial to the justification of 
state ownership, it is not being solved by state monopoly in telecomms. As 
, . 
discussed in Section 3.2, the best solution is to enhance competition, which allows 
the market to drive prices toward a marginal-cost-basis equilibrium. 16 
2.3 (b) - X-inefficiency 
X-efficiency (also known as technical efficiency) is achieved when a given level of 
output is produced using the absolute minimum level of inputs. (Leibenstein 1966, 
p. 406) Firms which have achieved technical efficiency are therefore producing 
on the edge of their production possibility frontier (PPF). Many firms, however, 
produce in an x-inefficient manner, well within their PPFs: "The simple fact is that 
neither individuals nor firms work as hard, nor do they search for information as 
effectively, as they could." (Leibenstein 1966, p. 407) 
A firm's degree of x-inefficiency is a function of three interrelated elements, in . 
descending order of importance: 
• external motivation efficiency; created by the threat of competition; 
• intra-plant motivational efficiency; created by alignment of incentives, 
appropriate training, and good communication; 
• non-market input efficiency; measuring a firm's ability to attract and 
retain top-quality human resources. (Leibenstein 1966, p. 413) 
External Motivation 
X-inefficiency is a negative function of competition, so it is greatest in firms which 
have the smallest threat of external competition. Large, monopolistic corporations 
in the private sector frequently fall prey to some degree of x-inefficiency. State-
owned monopolies, however, are generally considered to be much more x-
16 An alternative approach to understanding the loss of allocative efficiency without marginal cost pricing is 
in terms of net willingness to pay (NWTP). NWTP (or consumer surplus) is equal to the area under the 
demand curve from the origin to the quantity demanded in equilibrium, less the total cost of producing that 
output. NWTP is maximised (the Pareto efficient condition) by setting price equal to the marginal cost of 





inefficient than any private companies because even the remote threat of external 
competition is eliminated by statute. The statutory prohibitions on competition of 
any kind with Telkom have contributed to high levels of x-inefficiency. 
;a 
Intra-plant motivation 
Intra-plant motivation is also low at Telkom, because workers have been 
traditionally protected by political interests and strong unions. Without the threat 
of competition in the labour markets, Telkom has become characterised by, 
"overly complex networks of dysfunctional bureaucratic controls." (Commander 
and Killick 1988, p. 19) Even in the post-commercialisation era, Telkom workers 
have been protected by highly restrictive agreements which limit the number of 
employees who can be retrenched due to restructuring and rationalisation. 
Based both on the theory of x-inefficiency and on the empirical evidence provided 
by other countries, Telkom' s x-inefficiency can be expected to decrease simply 
through industry restructuring. McKinsey & Co. estimates generally that 
productivity increases of 20% or more are achievable by exposing SBEs to 
competition. (see Niels 1990 and Durchslag & Rao 1993) 
In the case of Telkom, aligning management's interests with those of profit-
seeking shareholders (see Section 2.3(d)), and promoting external competition in 
all markets would combine to motivate management highly. Moreover, by 
dividing Telkom into smaller, competing units, some of the x-inefficiency which 
appears to be inherent to large organisations will be eliminated. 
2.3 (c) - Stifled Technological Innovation 
A further consequence of statutory monopoly is its chilling effect on technological 
innovation. Under normal circumstances technological improvements will 
continually push outward the production possibility frontier. Under statutory 
monopoly, these outward shifts do not take place with the same frequency and or 
magnitude as they would under a competitive industry structure. Technological 





in at least two ways: lack of internal incentives and impossibility of entry by 
innovative entrepreneurs 
Internal incentives 
Similar to the forces causing x-inefficiency, technological innovation is greatly 
reduced within Telkom by the absence of external competition. (Leibenstein 1966, 
p. 407) There is no managerial incentive to innovate, nor to transfer technology 
from other sources. Since managers do not participate in the potential economic 
profits to be gained from technological innovation, they have no rational 
motivation to expose themselves to the career risks and additional work which 
technological improvements imply. 
Impossibility of Entry 
In a competitive market, previously important barriers to entry are surmounted by 
the adaptation of new technologies. The natural process of innovation facilitated 
by entrepreneurial companies ensures continual technological advancement. In 
South Africa, however, no company can legally take advantage of technological 
breakthroughs in telecomms (either developed internally or imported from 
overseas) by competing with Telkom. These internal and external factors combine 
to explain why Telkom has neither created internally nor acquired many of the 
technological improvements described in Section 2.2. 
2.3 (d) - Principal-agent Problems 
In a conceptual sense, the current owners of Telkom are the citizens of South 
Africa, with their property rights exercised by a representative sovereign 
government.17 The goals of these citizens as principals (as outlined in Section 3.1) 
are likely to conflict with the goals of Telkom's managers, who are meant to act as 
agents in pursuing the goals of the principals. The broad parameters of this 
principal-agent problem are summarised by the possibility that Telkom managers 
may succumb to: 





"(a) moral hazard, where the agent may expend less than optimal effort, 
and (b) adverse selection, where the agent may expend an inappropriate 
type of effort." (Nilakant and Rao 1994, p. 653) 
Manifestations of the principal-agent problem may be apparent in the x-
inefficiency condition described in Section 2.3(a), but also may result in agents' 
"diverting resources to their personal use." (Nilakant and Rao 1994, p. 651) 
In private-sector organisations, principals also frequently entrust tasks to agents. 
Under that ownership structure, however, principals exercise greater monitoring 
and discipline power through "incentive schemes, external labour markets, and 
capital markets." (Nilakant and Rao 1994, p. 651) In the case of Telkom, none of 
those disciplinary tools are available, and the agents' accountability to the 
principals is negligible. 
Compensation schemes are limited by the inability to sell ownership shares to 
employees, which would create an incentive to produce more efficiently, and by 
the fact that profit-maximisation has not been a Telkom objective, making 
measurement of success more difficult.· Labour markets are heavily distorted by 
previous governmental policy (job reservation and Bantu education). The supply 
of workers with the necessary education and experience to work in 
telecommunications is severely restricted, which reduces the ability to replace 
shirkers. Discipline from the capital markets is impossible, since principals are not 
legal owners, and do not have the ability to sell their positions in response to poor 
management results. 
Not subject to these disciplinary tools, the agents have little accountability to their 
principals, and, as expected in positivist agency theory, use this freedom to pursue 
their own objectives. 
2.4 Conclusion on Economics of State Monopoly 
The DPT /Telkom structure was designed to ameliorate market failures, 
particularly natural monopoly and undersupply of services. Although fears of 
these market failures were legitimate when Telkom was founded, technological 





improvements in the industry have largely removed the need for state ownership 
on this basis. Therefore, no societal benefits appear to result directly from the 
state monopoly structure. 
Rather than being utility neutral (i.e.,.simply creating no societal benefit), the state 
monopoly structure actually harms the South African economy by perpetuating 
allocative inefficiencies, by creating x-inefficiencies by restraining technological 
improvement, and exacerbating the principal-agent problem. By removing 
statutory barriers to competition and by changing the ownership structure of 




m OPilONSAND OPI11\1ISA.TION- INDUSTRY CHANGES 
3.0 Introduction 
Based on the evidence presented in Chapter II, the current state-monopoly 
structure of South Africa's telecomms industry is both sub-optimal and untenable 
for a globally competitive economy. Improving the situation will require a two-
pronged approach: 
• systematic increase in industrywide competition and 
• restructuring and privatisation of Telko1:Jl. 
Chapter III deals primarily with the means for increasing competition in the South 
African telecomms industry .. Section 3.1 presents the broad societal goals which a 
restructuring is intended to accomplish: it is essentially a description of the ideal 
telecomms industry, as restructured through privatisation and enhanced 
competition. 
Section 3.2 presents specific steps for enhancing competition in South African 
telecommunications. These steps include primarily the removal of barriers to 
entry and other liberalising policies. Section 3.3 presents ari ·array of possible 
ownership structures for a re-organised Telkom, and assesses the ·viability of each 
system in helping to approach the ideal of Section 3.1. 
3.1 Parameters of the Optimal Telecomms Industry 
The broad parameters of an ideal system create a benchmark against which any 
industry structure can be measured. Although some of the goals outlined in 
describing the optimal telecomms structure are inconsistent with each other, it is 
important to acknowledge explicitly the tradeoffs which will have to be made in 
structuring the industry for South Africa. Broadly speaking, the goals of an ideal 
system are likely to include: extension of service to underserviced communities; 




services; improved customer service and responsiveness; low prices for basic 
services.18 
E~tension of Service 
It is crucial to make affordable, reliable telecomms service available to all South 
Africans, regardless of income level and geographic location . 
. 
" ... telecommunications lies at the very heart of progress. This is true in 
the political and social sense ... and it is true in the more practical sense 
that development depends on communications for logistical efficiency. " 
(Pitroda 1993, p. 76) 
Progress toward universal service creates the positive externalities which are 
described in Section 2.l(b), and will promote the redistribution of wealth and 
income to disadvantaged South Africans. Although the extension of service is an 
explicit goal of the current Telkom management team (Telkom 1993, p. 11), a 
credible plan for increasing telephone penetration levels amongst previously 
underserviced groups must be agreed upon by all stakeholders.19 
Much of the funding for increased network penetration could legitimately come 
from existing telecomms subscribers. As noted in Section 2.l(b), the value of the 
network to existing subscribers is a positive function of the number of subscribers 
included. Therefore, an appropriate temporary subsidy could be calculated to 
expand service, with the benefits of higher penetration equalling the price 
increases to existing subscribers. 
Community phone banks 
Although universal service is a desirable goal, unless considerable creativity is 
exercised it is difficult to achieve within the parameters of marginal-cost pricing. 
An obvious solution to extending availability of phone service to rural and low-
18 It is important to note that these are broad goals for a telecommunications system, as described in Pitroda 
(1993); Durchslag and Rao (1993); McKinsey & Co. (1993); Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1990); Munston 
(1988); and Durchslag, Puri and Rao (1994). The specific goals of a restructured Telkom would have to be 
determined by management, customers and the regulating authority. 
19 Telkom has announced a R6 billion plan to install one million phone lines in the former TVBC states, 
contracting out much of the work to a strategic partner from overseas. This initiative will need to be repeated 
in many other impoverished regions in order to increase penetration on a national basis. 
- ... ' -.. -- -·- ·.-·~ -.·----- ···-:,-··-.-,-,.... -





income areas is to establish community phone banks and voice-mail systems 
which allow service providers to allocate fixed costs of installation across groups 
of low-use subscribers. Centralisation of community phones also allows for better 
physical security of assets and easier billing, both of which will reduce the costs of 
providing service. Once installed, community phones become: "as critical as 
water, food, shelter and health services. " (Pitroda 1993) Moreover, community 
phones: 
" ... become an instrument of social change, fundamental to the process of 
democratisation." (Pitroda 1993) 
One possible means for installing community phones on a broad basis is to sell 
ordinary subscriber equipment equipped with small meters to rural 
entrepreneurs. Telephone owners set up their machines in village centers, and 
charge customers to make or receive calls, based on meter readings. Although 
local competition must be safeguarded in each village, the spread of 
telecommunications penetration can be increased rapidly. 
Availability of Value-Added Network Services (VANS) 
Global improvements in telecommunications and computing technology have 
spawned an incredible array of new value-added services. Although Telkom has 
made the introduction of VANS a management priority, including a "rewriting of 
the rule book to allow previously forbidden VANS," (Telkom 1993B, p. 30) the 
development of these services in South Africa has been inexplicably slow. By way 
· of comparison, in the U.S., for example, local telephone companies generally offer 
at least the following services to their residential and commercial customers: 
.. 
• Call waiting• - functionally equivalent to having two incoming phone 
lines on a single subscriber number 
• Call forwarding• - transfers incoming calls to a chosen number at 
another location 
Indicates a service which is either "in development," is available on a trial basis in selected areas, or is 




• Voice mail"" - allows callers to leave voice messages when a subscriber's 
line is engaged or goes unanswered. The subscriber can retrieve 
messages from the home phone or from remote locations. 
~. • Caller identification - flashes the telephone number from which an 
incoming call originates 
• Three-way or conference calling 
• Automated third-party and collect billing services - reduces the cost of 
maltjng calls from pay phones or from other remote locations 
• Automated repeat dialing - attempts to make a connection on a repeated 
basis if a line is engaged or goes unanswered 
• Speed dialing and voice-activated speed dialing - allows a subscriber to 
specify a group of frequently called numbers, and accesses them by 
pushing a single key or by speaking an identifying word into the 
receiver at the specified time. 
These value-added services are in addition to standard features such as itemised 
billing, all-digital exchanges, calling-card services and modular connections for 
data, voice and facsimile communication. 
Clearly these services are not appropriate for all South African telephone 
subscribers, but their value for commertial and home-business customers, as well 
as some residences, is readily apparent. 
Improved Customer Service 
A logical complement to universal access and availability of value-added services 
is an improvement in customer service. Customer satisfaction with Telkom's 
service is very low, and does not appear to be improving. More important,. as new 
subscribers come onto the network, and as existing subscribers have their service 
. options expanded, the role of consumer education will be of heightened 
importance. 
Improved customer service would include decreased waiting times for new 
installation, improved responsiveness to equipment and connection problems, 
itemised billing for services, development of large-account service teams, and a 
general re-focus on customer satisfaction. 






Although cross-subsidisation is not economically eff~cient, low prices are essential 
for extending the network. It is important, therefore, for marginal costs to be kept 
. as low as possible, .so as to maximise the affordability of phone service for poor 
South Africans. ·Specifically, this requires maximum technical efficiency on the 
parts of service providers, an assurance (preferably through competition) that 
monopoly profits are not being taken, and continual outward shifts of the PPP 
through technological improvement. 
3.2 Increasing Competition Industr.ywide 
To approach the ideals of the system described in Section 3.1, two processes need 
to take place: 
• a series of inter-related policy decisions designed to heighten the 
competitiveness of various segments of the telecommunications 
industry; 
• an operational and financial division of Telkom into independent units, 
and the sale or distribution of these operating units. 
The division and privatisation of Telkom is discussed in detail in Chapter IV. The 
remainder of Chapter III is devoted to making the industry as a whole more 
competitive, independent of privatisation and restructuring for the state 
monopoly. 
In the area of competitiveness, most of the technological barriers to competition 
have long been surmounted in other parts of the world. Part of making South 
African telecomms more competitive will require the incorporation of expensive 
new technology. Immediate improvements can also be made, however, and most 
of these will be easy and inexpensive to implement. Some of these steps require 
Parliamentary action, others require initiative by managements of private 
companies and non-Telkom SBEs. To create a competitive industry, the following 
immediate steps are available: 




The easiest first step is to rewrite the regulatory statutes to permit free competition 
in all areas of telecommunications which are not reasonably subject to monopoly 
ablises. Specifically, the manufacture and import of telecommunications 
equipment (particularly subscriber equipment) should be liberalised entirely. Any 
company which desires to compete in the telecomms hardware business in South 
Africa should be allowed to do so immediately. 
Ownership and installation of pay telephones should also be liberalised entirely, 
ending Telkor's monopoly on this service. Telkom can immediately implement a 
programme of privately leased "community pay phones" as described in Section 
3.1. In addition, private-sector providers should be permitted to compete in the 
~ 
provision of value-added services such as facsimile transmission, voice mail and 
other services. 
In removing legal barriers to competition, Parliament's assumption should be that 
all aspects of the telecomms industry '":ill be deregulated, and that the burden of 
proof is on incumbent providers to establish reasons that continuing state 
monopoly is necessary. Fulfilling this burden of proof will require incumbent 
providers to engage in systematic (and public) argument to persuade regulators 
that consumers' welfare would be enhanced by continued monopoly. 
Empower the Department of Posts & Telecommunications 
In order for deregulation to be accepted by the South African populace, and to 
ensure that monopoly abuses are detected and dealt with swiftly, Parliament must 
create and empower a regulatory body. Presumably the vestigial Department of 
Posts.and Telecommunications (DPT) will be restructured into an effective vehicle 
for promulgating regulations and for enforcing the competitive nature of the 
telecomrns industry. 20 
20 It appears likely that the DPT will be replaced by a new, broadly empowered regulatory agency called the 
Independent Telecommunications Authority (ITA). 
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To make the DPT (or ITA) an effective regulatory body, Parliament will have to 
define its mandate broadly (e.g., to increase competition) and provide it with the 
r~sources and authority necessary to do an adequate job.21 
• 
Licence additional service providers 
Because Telkom will continue to own the poles:-and-wires of the telecomms 
network, simple deregulation will not be enough to introduce competition into 
various segments of the telecomms market. Competition should be encouraged 
by granting licences to any company which satisfies basic competitive 
requirements. These requirements are likely to include: 
• adequate financial capital 
• experience in telecommunications 
• ability to guarantee the integrity of the network 22 
Mandatory open access to Telkom's existing network must be. one aspect of 
competition. Telkom must provide access on a compensated basis to the network 
to all licenced long-distance service providers. 23 Mandated rights of access must 
includ~ the cable and satellite connections for overseas calls as well. These 
competitive service providers will provide their own switching equipment and 
will allow subscribers to choose a long-distance and short-distance carriers for 
themselves.. Eventually, competing providers can be expected to construct their ,,. 
own long-distance networks, providing optical fibfe of their own and 
piggybacking on the existing poles and pipes systems. 
In addition to mandatory open access, a protocol must be devised which 
compensates local-service providers for providing call-completion access to long-
distance companies. 
21 Regulation is discussed further in Section 5.1. 
22 These will be the criteria to receive a licence to compete in the German telecommunications market after 
Deutsche Telekom is privatised. The German government will not award a fixed number of licences, but will 
allow any companies or consortia meeting the criteria to enter the market. (Financial Times 1995, p.1) 
23 The pricing for access to the Telkom network must be somewhat complicated in order to compensate 
Telkom fairly and to reduce allocative inefficiency. The access pricing should be based on "efficient 
component pricing (ECR)". ECR requires that the price equal the marginal cost to the network (primarily wear 
and tear) plus the opportunity cost of allowing in the competitor's call at that time. The ECR structure is 
described in Baumol & Sidak "Toward Competition in Local Telephony" 1993). 




Nearly 900,000 South African households are currently connected to the cable 
television network. (New York Times 1994, p. A4) Assuming that all of these 
homes also have telephone service, the cable hookup provides an opportunity for 
unfettered competition in digital communication (i.e., reception of digital data for 
both television and telephone services). Although the technology for this type of 
competition is still in development, cable television companies will soon compete 
on a house-by-house basis for telephone subscribers with minimal additional 
investment (primarily switching equipment). 
Expand the use of existing telecomms alternatives 
Although Telkom has monopolised commercial and residential telecomms 
services in South Africa, reasonably sophisticated alternative networks have also 
been developed for other users. Specifically, Transnet operates a country-wide 
telecommunication network called Transtel for its internal purposes. By 
upgrading the switching capability of the Transtel network and piggybacking on 
Telkom wires where necessary, South Africa could have a viable alternative to the 
Telkom network in place very quickly and at minimal expense. 
Expansion of Trans tel' s use will increase existing telecomms capacity and provide 
· a ready physical capability for new competition. The fact that Transtel is already 
owned by the government, and could be quickly sold or leased to the private 
sector, means that competitive service providers could be brought on line almost 
immediately. 
Auction electromagnetic spectrum 
Although wireless telecommunication is currently structured to promote modest 
competition (i.e., duopoly), all future use of precious electromagnetic spectrum 
should be allocated according to market principles. As soon as the existing period 
of wireless-communication duopoly expires, the spectrum which is to be i:eserved 
for cellular telephones, for satellite communication, and for other broad- and 




The spectrum auction should be open to all participants (without regard to 
nationality), and should be designed to maximise revenues to the state. Although 
s_ome efforts should be made to avoid monopolisation by a single bidder group, in .. 
a completely global auction this should not be a problem. 
3.3 Conclusion 
. 
Regardless of the ownership structure of Telkom, a number of steps can be taken 
immediately to increase competition in the telecomms industry. Most of these 
steps simply involve the removal of legal barriers to entry. Others require positive 
action on the part of government to provide opportunities for potential entrants. 
If competition is substantially increased, much of the struggle to improve 
telecomms in South Africa will be complete. The invisible hand of the market will 
drive out much of the x-inefficiency in existing service providers, and will enforce 
a pricing regime which more closely approximates allocative efficiency. 
Moreover, the creative-destruction dynamic of technological innovation will be 
spurred by new entrants and finally allowed to flourish. 
Table 2: SUMMARY OF COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING 
Competivising Action 
Remove legal barriers 
Empower the DPT (or ITA) 
Licence additional providers 
Encourage convergence 




Enact legislation which allows competition to prevail in all 
areas of the telecomms industry. 
Charge a federal regulatory agency explicitly with promoting 
competition in the telecomms industry, and fund it adequately 
to do the job. Shift the burden of legitimisation for any non-
competitive behavior onto the incumbent producer. 
Allow and encourage entrepreneurs to provide telecomms 
services as long as the integrity of the network is protected 
Minimise regulatory interference in the digital convergence 
between telecomms and broadcast communication 
Encourage alternative telecomms providers (e.g., Transnet's 
Transtel system) to begin providing telecomms services to the 
public 
As existing commitments expire, auction off all use of 
electromagnetic spectrum, without preference for national 
origin of purchasers. If existing contracts are perpetual, force a 
renegotiation under the principle of eminent domain. 





Although increased competition will go a long way toward achieving the 
optimizing improvements in South African telecomms, a major question remains 
abou~ the optimal structure of the Telkom monopoly. Particularly in the decade 
following liberalisation, if left in its current form, Telkom will continue to be a 
significant force in the market 
The success or failure of the overall industry restructuring depends on the societal 
value which can be created from Telkom's restructuring. Evidence suggests that 
revenue from the sale of parastatals can be increased (all other things remaining 
equal) by undertaking operational improvements and restructuring prior to the 
sale. A study of privatised companies in Southeast Asia finds that higher profit 
margins (a proxy for operational efficiency) increase the market/book value at 
date of initial public offering. (Hermer 1993, p. 2). Moreover, privatisation experts 
conclude that basic restructuring adds to the sale value and increases the number 
of likely buyers. 
"Governments are not particularly good at fixing broken companies, but 
when they are properly assisted, and get it right, the economic benefit can 
be enormous." (Robson 1995) 
Chapter IV discusses the optimal structure for Telkom in a post-liberalised 
industry structure. Section 4.1 describes the operational restructuring which 
Parliament and Telkom management need to undertake. This restructuring is 
necessary to further enhance industrywide competitiveness and to improve 
efficiency at the operating level. 
Section 4.2 outlines a variety of ownership structures which might apply to the 
new Telkom sub-units. These ownership structures are summarised in a table 
found at the end of Section 4.2. Section 4.3 concludes the chapter. 




In its current form, Telkom is an omnibus provider of telecomms services to South 
Af!ican businesses and residences. The Company is essentially a conglomerate of 
;a 
vertically integrated service providers, sharing common senior management and a 
common owner. The crucial first step in optimising Telkom should be to "re-
organise the fi:r:n around economically rational business units." (Durchslag, Puri & 
Rao 1994, p. 9) 
• 
As describedin Section 1.4, Telkom is currently organised in a matrix form, with 
responsibilities allocated along functional and geographic bases. The internal 
divisions would become the framework for creating an array of independent new 
companies. Specifically, the decentralisation of operational authority would be 
accelerated and formalised, with most functions absorbed by regional operating 
comparues. 
In re-organising Telkom, the assumption should be that the centralised functions 
of the Company would be absolutely minimised, and that lines of business would 
either be devolved to the regions or sold. The long-distance services division can 
continue to exist as a national operation, and would represent corporate continuity 
for Telkom. Essentially all other corporate-level functions of Telkom would be 
devolved, separated or would cease to exist. In summary, Telkom's monolithic 
structure would be broken up into regional operating companies and specialised 
functions. Specifically the independent divisions would include at· least the 
following 24: 
• Long-distance Services (Telkom LO) 
• Six geographically specific regional operating companies (TROCs) 
• Cellular communications 
• Other services and miscellaneous businesses 
24 Many of the proposed operational restructuring concepts are inspired by the Modified Final Judgment 
(MFJ) which settled the anti-trust lawsuit between the U.S. Department of Justice and AT&T. 





Telkom's long-distance operating unit (hereafter referred to as "Telkom LD") 
would represent the continuity of Telkom's corporate identity. After all unrelated 
lines of business are cleaved from it, the residual. business would be the long-
distance service provider. Telkom LD would retain ownership rights to Telkom's 
inter-regional telecomms assets, including transmission lines, and switching 
equipment. As discussed in Section 3.2, Telkom LD would be required to provide 
access to all local-service providers (TROCs and others) on an equal basis. Telkom 
LD would pay local-service providers a fee for access to their local networks, 
which would allow the long-distance providers to complete their calls. 
In addition to line access, new entrants to the long-distance market can be 
expected to eventually string their own optical-fibre. In that event, they would be 
guaranteed access to certain physical assets (e.g. utility poles and subterranean 
pipes) as they construct their own networks of lines and switches. Of course, 
Telkom LD would be compensated by its new competitors for the rental of 
existing infrastructural assets. 
TROCs (Regional service providers) 
At present, Telkom's Operations Division is divided into six regions: 
Witwatersrand, Transvaal, Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Orange Free State, 
Northern Cape and KwaZulu/Natal. 25 As part of Telkom's restructuring, each of 
these regional units would be transformed into an independent provider of local 
and regional telecomms services. These independent units would be known as 
Telkom Regional Operating Companies, or TROCs. The six TROCs would 
eventually be transferred into the private sector, but should be regulated to the 
extent that they are able to exercise monopoly power in their geographic regions.26 
25 It is not known whether Telkom has restructured its geographical coverage to reflect the new political 
boundaries within South Africa. The description of regional coverage areas, the genesis of the TROC 
structure, is from Telkom's 1993 profile. Telkom's regional operating structure may have changed since the 
~ril 1994 election. 
2 Presumably the higher-density TROCs would face competition from cable television and wireless 
communication much earlier than their rural counterparts. Therefore, the urban TROCs would likely require 




The organisation, scope of service and capitalisation of the TROCs needs to be 
negotiated as part of the restructuring process. Originally it is envisioned that the 
TROCs would be limited to providing communication services (including 
telephone, data and cable), within their geographic region, and would be 
prohibited from operating in the market for long-distance or international 
communications services. This restriction can be relaxed in the medium term, to 
further heighten the level of competition nationwide. 
Assuming that cross-subsidisation from regulated operations can be prevented, 
the TROCs would be free immediately to compete nationwide in additional 
markets, including: 
• cellular and other wireless services 
• ownership of foreign telecomms networks 
• manufacturing and marketing of telecomms equipment. 
A close regulatory watch must be kept, however, to prevent anti-competitive 
behavior (e.g., cross-subsidisation from regulated monopoly businesses). 
The establishment of the TROCs is a critical element of the overall restructuring of 
telecomms in SA. Although they would retain a certain degree of local monopoly 
power, their decentralisation and their freedom to compete in other businesses 
will greatly increase the base-line level of competition.27 The TROCs' ability to 
own (or invest in) telecomms companies outside SA would speed the transfer of 
technology to other African countries. 
Cellular Communications 
Telkom owns 50% of a joint venture called Vodacom, which shares the duopoly 
rights to cellular services in South Africa. Under a general industry restructuring, 
this duopoly should eventually be broken up into multi-local competitive 
structures, and the rights re-allocated on the basis of an auction for rights to the 
electromagnetic spectrum. Telkom's interest in Vodacom should either be sold to 
L1 The TROCs' monopoly power in local telephony, as traditionally defined, would be mitigated by the 
emergence of non-traditional communications alternatives, including cellular, Personal Communications 




the joint-venture partners (Vodaphone and Rembrandt), or put into a newly 
formed independent company. 
It should be permissible for Telkom LD and the TROCs to compete for local 
cellular rights, but great care must be taken to prevent cross-subsidisation from 
regulated services to the cellular segment. 
Similar to the mandated open relationship between the TROCs and long-distance 
service providers (Telkom LD and other anticipated entrants), network-based 
services should be required to make their networks accessible for cellular 
connections. Operational division between the TROCs and cellular operations 
should help to ensure fairness. 
Manufacturing and other servkes 
Despite the need for maintenance of technological standards, there is no reason for 
a Telkom unit to be engaged in the manufacture of telecommunications hardware. 
Direct manufacture of hardware by Telkom subsidiaries appears to be minimal. 
These operations would be packaged into a small, independent unit and prepared 
for sale. All exclusive long-term contracting (like the MSAs) should be 
discontinued (for the reasons cited in Section 2.3), and all statutory competitive 
barriers in manufacturing should be eliminated. 
Other services provided by Telkom should also be discontinued, sold or spun off 
into private companies. For example, the recently formed radio-trunking network 
joint venture (Q-Trunk), the maritime radio service, the Innobel electronic 
dictionary service, telephone directory services, and pay telephone services 
(Telkor) should not be included in the core Telkom LD nor in any of the TROCs. 
Instead they should be restructured and operated as independent companies, 
consolidating any of the subsidiaries }'Vhich have material operating synergies. 
Any transactions conducted with former Telkom subsidiaries must be negotiated 
and priced strictly on an arm's-length basis as soon as the operational 
restructuring has commenced. Later these independent units may be sold to 




The Telkom Development Institute (TOI) should also be privatised, or should be 
transformed into an independent research unit, funded by Telkom LO and the 
T~OCs, but operationally independent of them. 
;a 
Section 4.2 -Ownership Structures 
Having divid_ed Telkom into its component parts, the ownership of each part 
becomes a critical issue. Change in ownership structure is most important for 
alleviating the x-inefficiency and principal-agent problems described in Section 
2.3. Strategic and financial investors, motivated by desire for profits, are likely to 
monitor the actions of their agents more closely than incumbent government 
overseers. Subjecting Telkom management to greater monitoring and disciplinary 
control through the capital markets is likely to improve performance in many 
dimensions. 
Ownership structure can be evaluated along two primary vectors: percentage of 
government ownership (0% to 100%, with a crucial break at 51 %) and the 
. . 
· composition and representation of non-government owners (general public, 
strategic buyers, financial institutions, foreign telecommunications companies, 
foreign individuals and existing Telkom management). An infinite number of 
ownership combinations can be conceived of for each operational unit, many of 
which serve complementary goals. The structures to examine for comparative 
purposes are: 
• 100% government ownership (status quo) 
• 51 % - 99% government ownership (partial privatisation) 
• 51 % - 100% ownership by individual South African citizens (popular 
pri va tis a ti on) 




If the issue of ownership is stated differently, the optimal ownership structure for 
each Telkom unit can be determined by answering a series of questions 28: 
• Should government continue to own any part of the unit? 
• Are there any reasons that foreign companies should not own a 
controlling stake in the unit? 
• Will ownership by a foreign telecomms partner provide material 
benefits in the form of technology transfer or foreign direct investment? 
• Are the transaction costs of a per-capita distribution of shares very high 
relative to the unit's economic value? 
Because the technological, financial, and managerial needs of each separated 
business will be different, there can not be a single privatisation method which 
will be most appropriate for all of them. By examining each of the highlighted 
structures in light ofthese questions, some determinations can be made about the 
optimal post-privatisation structure of each unit. 
It is extremely important to note that all of the methods described have significant 
advantages and disadvantages if used as the sole means for privatisation. One 
goal of examining each of the methods separately is to consider means by which 
they can be combined. Combinations of privatisation methods may enable South 
Africa to reap the benefits from each method while avoiding the disadvantages. 
Regardless of each unit's circumstances, the process must remain focused on the 
overriding goals which will be described in Section 5.3. Most important, the 
decisions must be made on a transparent basis, with full accountability . 
Status Quo (1003 Government Ownership) 
For all of the reasons described in Section 2.3, it is clear that 100% government 
ownership is a sub-optimal structure for Telkom and for the economy. Given the 
competition-enabling advancements in technology, and the government's 
continuing ability to regulate private providers of telecomms services, there are no 
economically sound reasons for continued government ownership of any 
restructured Telkom units. 




The difficulty faced by existing principals (citizens) in monitoring the actions of 
Telkom management strengthens the rationale for changing the ownership 
structure. Privatisation "brings to bear monitoring by debt and equity holders, 
which," along with well-defined property rights, can be expected to improve 
performance. (Evans 1993, p. 59). 
Arguments potentially could be made for the government to continue operating 
units which serve an undeniably public goal (e.g., maritime radio), but would not 
be profitable in private hands. In that case, government might contract out and 
pay directly for the administration of those services. There appears to be no 
inherent benefit in having government employees themselves managing the 
operation of these businesses. 
Partial Privatisation (13-993 government ownership) 
Unless there are clearly identifiable economic rationale for continued government 
ownership, the government's equity stake should be eventually reduced to zero in 
all parts of the restructured Telkom. The purpose of representative government is 
to govern, and there are no readily apparent societal benefits to having 
government officials act as equity investors. Over time, therefore, the assumption 
must be that the government will divest itself, of ownership in all Telkom assets. 
Based on empirical evidence (see Niels 1990), this step of divestment alone should 
improve the technical efficiency of the operating units. 
Of course, the government does have a legitimate ongoing role in preventing 
market failure in the telecomms industry. To the extent that market failure 
continues to be a risk, operating control which the government previously 
achieved through direct ownership can be replicated through effective regulation. 
For political reasons it might make sense for the government to retain a so-called 
"golden share" in some Telkom units The golden share allows the government to 
exercise operational control over the telecomms industry in times of national 
Section 5.3, in discussing the objectives for the privatisation . 




crisis. After the national crisis ended, ownership (and reparations) would, of 
course, return to the rightful owner. The golden share can also be used block 
sqategic decisions which are seen to contradict the national interest directly. 
;a 
Strategic Sale (513 - 1003 ownership by operating company)29 
Telecommunications companies headquartered in North America, East Asia and 
Europe have purchased controlling shares in the privatised telecomms networks 
in many developing countries. 
The economic advantages of selling a controlling stake to foreign operators 
(through a tender auction) are indisputable. (Durchslag, Puri & Rao 1994, p. 16) 
First, auction to a foreign partner is maximally transparent and creates a 
significant inflow of stable foreign direct investment. It is also likely to present the 
likeliest method for maximising revenue from the sale. The chief advantage of 
selling control to foreign strategic investors, however, is the "rapid migration of 
skills" and the technology transfer which the new proprietors provide. (McKinsey 
& Co. 1993, p. 24) 
The primary disadvantage in selling to a foreign multinational is the perceived 
loss of control, and the political difficulty which results. For many reasons, some 
countries object to having elements of their infrastructure controlled by foreign 
institutions. Telkom's corporate communications office (not a disinterested 
source) offers the dire prediction that, "relinquishing control of such a highly 
strategic resource ... could well be a recipe for disaster." (Telkom 1993B, p. 36) 
These fears can be allayed through maximum transparency in the process, 
prominent and trustworthy regulatory agencies, and effective public relations. If 
necessary the golden share can be granted to reduce security concerns, although 
this is likely to reduce the value of bids. 
29 Presumably a strategic investor would be a foreign telecommunications company or a consortium of 
foreign and domestic firms. Although foreign domicile is not an absolute requirement for the strategic 
investor in a successful privatisation, in order for technology transfer and foreign investment to occur it 
appears to be a very strong likelihood. 
. ' \. 




Sale to foreign strategic investors is most appropriate for those Telkom businesses 
which are in greatest need of technological improvement, and for those which are 
in already competitive markets. Of the specific units described in Section 4.1, 
Telkom LD is the most likely to be sold successfully and at a high price. The 
TROCs are also likely to be attractive oh a stand-alone basis, particularly those 
located in densely populated geographic regions. Based on experiences in other 
countries, it i~ unlikely that foreign telecomms companies and consortia will bid 
heavily for Telkom assets unless they are offered controlling interests. 
If the political disadvantages of foreign ownership can be minimised through 
good public relations and (if necessary) through deployment of a golden share, 
private sale of the majority interest in the largest Telkom units may be the best 
means of furthering the goals of the restructuring. 
IPO method -(Sale of shares to investors) 
In developed countries, the most common method of privatising large SBEs has 
been to sell their equity onto the shares market in an initial public offering (IPO). 
Assuming that the shares are auctioned off, rather than subscribed to at a pre-
determined price, the IPO method has many advantages: 
• it creates a highly liquid market for domestic and foreign investors to 
participate in ownership of the newly privatised entity; 
• it raises large amounts of cash for the government; 
• it is highly transparent in valuation and execution. 
The drawbacks to the IPO method are considered two-fold. First, it tends to dilute 
ownership control very thoroughly, which entrenches existing management. A 
broad distribution of shares also increases the costs (and decreases the likelihood 
of success) for any acquiror to purchase a controlling stake in the privatised 
company. In the absence of concentrated ownership, management power remains 
dominant after the privatisation. 30 
30 The dispersion of ownership, and concomitant dilution of pressure by owners creates a principal-agent 




A second drawback, more important in the case of many Telkom units, is that an 
IPO is unlikely to result in acquisition by a strategic investor. If technology 
tqmsfer and an influx of foreign capital are deemed desirable goals of the 
;a 
privatisation process, they are less likely to be achieved unless a strategic investor 
acquires a controlling stake in major units. This is unlikely to happen if 
privatisation i? effected solely through an IPO. 
A partial IPO is of considerable interest, since the benefits of the transaction are 
still realised (specifically the public float and market valuation), while large blocs 
of equity can still be held by a single shareholder. 
Public Share Ownership (per-capita distribution of shares) 
Although there are clear benefits to foreign strategic investment in Telkom, a 
major appeal of privatisation is the opportunity to distribute equity ownership 
(and/ or cash) to South African citizens. The "progressive privatisation" or 
"populist capitalism" strategy reduces wealth-distribution inequality, binds 
society together through common ownership interest, and is politically popular. 
The crucial goal in progressive privatisation is to distribute a valuable equity 
instrument broadly. As long as it is effective, the specific method for distributing 
value broadly (e.g., coupon bidding) is not terribly important. 
Similar to the case with an IPO, the single great disadvantage of progressive 
privatisation by itself is that ownership and control inherently become dispersed. 
In this case, ownership control would be held collectively by a very large group of 
relatively unsophisticated (arid presumably inactive) investors nationwide. In the 
ownership-power vacuum, existing Telkom management is again likely to retain 
complete operating control. Under those circumstances management will be 
insulated from pressure to improve company results and to perform more 
efficiently. 
dispersion of ownership control tends to insulate management. The prohibitive organisational costs faced by 




To achieve the benefits of populist capitalism it makes sense for Telkom LO and 
the TROCs, in particular, to include a public equity component in their post-
privatisation ownership structure. To alleviate the dangers of control dispersion, it 
also makes sense to ensure that a controlling bloc .of shareholders is formed. This 
is why combining a public distribution of shares with direct sale of majority stake 
to a strategic investor may be the optimal strategy. At the very least, there should 
be no legal limits on the size of equity ownership stakes (as was the case with 
Iscor) 31 and there should be no long-term restrictions on the pooling, sale or 
transfer of shares. 
As noted above, assuming that value is distributed on a per-capita basis, the 
specific means of distribution is not terribly important. The choice of distribution 
method should be made on the basis of effective reach, cost, and transparency. 
Transaction costs may vary between methods (i.e., share distribution is 
complicated and costly), and the benefits may also diverge (i.e., there may be 
significant positive social externalities and educational benefits to distributing 
equity in a publicly traded company). 
Management buy-out 
Under other circumstances, many of the Telkom operating units would be 
attractive candidates for management-led leveraged buyouts (MBOs). Although 
Telkom LO and most of the TROCs would probably be too large to be disposed of 
in this fashion (particularly given the non-existence of a public corporate debt 
market in South Africa), some units might benefit from private ownership and 
continuity of management. 
In South Africa, however, MBOs of parastatal corporations are likely to be 
politically unacceptable. MBOs appear to reward entrenched (white) managers 
31 In the privatisation of Iscor, for example, equity ownership concentration was limited to 10% by any single 
entity. This limitation has allowed management to entrench itself and to operate with little performance 




financially, at the expense of the public weal.32 Moreover, the specialised capital 
markets for financing and promoting transactions of this type do not yet exist in 
SQuth Africa. Therefore, MBOs are unlikely to play a major role in the 
:a 
organisational restructuring of Telkom. 
4.3 Conclusion 
After steps are taken to make the telecommunications industry more competitive 
as a whole, further steps must be taken to restructure and privatise Telkom. The 
first, crucial step is to divide the monolithic Telkom into legally independent 
operating entities. The independent companies will be created by stripping off 
regional operations into six TROCs, and separating off ancillary services into an 
array of small companies, leaving only the long-distance services to continue 
operating under the Telkom name. 
After the business units are divided, re-organised and adequately capitalised, each 
must be prepared for sale or public flotation. The optimal strategy for divesting 
government's ownership in each Telkom subsidiary will depend on that particular 
unit's needs for technology, capital and management expertise. In no cases does it 
appear likely that government's continuing ownership of equity makes economic 
sense. The salient question is to whom, and how, each unit's shares will be 
divested. 
Of the various ownership structures examined, partial sale to foreign strategic 
investors appears to make the most sense for Telkom LD and for the larger 
TROCs. This strategy will provide maximum transfer of technology and increase 
in capital expenditure. The benefits of public distribution of shares are also 
strong, and indicate that the distribution of some equity on a per-capita basis 
would complement the goals of the privatisation. For the smaller Telkom units, 
32 A distribution of shares to rank-and-file employees ~ould be less politically unpopular, but given the long 
standing policies of job reservation, transfer of public wealth to selected (primarily white) employees, might 
still be seen as inequitable. Moreover, special distributions to employees would be less effective than pro-rata 
distribution in reducing wealth inequality. 





direct private sale to financial investors or to operating companies appears to 
make the most sense. 









Advantages in Isolation 
Minimises uncertainty and 
volatility 
Allows government to retain 
strategic control 
Allows for maximum technology 
transfer; provides foreign direct 
investment; is fast and relatively 
simple 
Raises cash; provides valuation 
benchmarks; politically popular 
Politically very popular; efficient 
means for distributing value and 
enabling citizens economically 
Provides continuity of 
management; increases efficiency 
through alignment of incentives 
Disadvantages in Isolation 
See Section 2.3 
Does not eliminate the problems 
outlined in Section 2.3 
May be politically unpopular, may 
raise sovereignty issues 
Does not encourage foreign direct 
investment nor technology transfer; 
leaves incumbent management in 
control 
Leaves incumbent management in 
control; does not raise cash; does not 
lead to FDI or technology transfer 
Politically very unpopular; may not 




CHAPTER V - SPECIFIC STEPS TO PRIVATISATION 
5.0 Introduction 
South Africa is fortunate because many of the steps which can lead to optimisation 
of the telecomms industry structure have already been taken. Specifically, 
commercialisation has made it much easier to envision the structure of a post-
privatisation telecomms company, and to forecast the steps needed to achieve that 
structure. Moreover, many of the changes which will increase general competition 
in the industry are easy and inexpensive to implement (as discussed in Section 
3.2). To complete the optimisation process, the following specific steps could be 
undertaken: 
• legislation by national and provincial Parliaments (Section 5.1) 
• organisational and financial restructuring (Section 5.2) 
• setting objectives for privatisation (Section 5.3) 
• three stages of ownership transfer (Sections 5.4, 5.5, 5.6) 
• implementation of new regulatory control (Section 5.7) 
5.1 Legislative Action 
The first order of business is for the national Parliament to pass five steps of 
legislation. These changes in legislation would include: 
1. allow for ownership and operating-structure changes in all Telkom 
companies and affiliates; 
2. remove all legal barriers to competition in telecommunications; 
3. reduce (then eliminate) all tariff and non-tariff barriers on the import of 
foreign telecomms equipment and services;33 
4. eliminate all restrictions on foreign investment in and foreign 
ownership of telecommunications concerns; 
5. empower the Department of Posts and Telecommunications and 
regional regulatory agencies to set regulatory goals, and to encourage 
industrywide competition. 
Specifically these legislative changes would involve enacting amendments to the 
Post Office Amendment Act (Number 85) of 1991 ("the Act"). Among others, 
33 South Africa's inclusion in the World Trade Organisation will require that these barriers be reduced in the 




Section 5(7) of the Act, which restricts share ownership solely to the South African 
government, will require alteration by Parliament. 
Prlvatisation Enablement 
Step 1 of the legislative changes outlines the process for privatising Telkom, and 
announces the intended goals of the process. This legislation should allow for 
great flexibility in accomplishing goals, but should set a reasonably strict time line 
for completion of the restructurings and ownership transfers. One critical 
component of the legislation is the appointment of a senior government official (of 
absolutely unimpeachable integrity and credibility) who will act as the 
"privatisation czar" for Telkom' s restructuring. 
Privatisation Czar 
The role of the privatisation czar is absolutely pivotal to the success of the efforts 
to restructure and optimise Telkom In fact, based on privatisation experiences in 
other countries, the choice of a privatisation czar is frequently the single most 
important factor in determining the success of the privatisation process. 
(Durchslag, Puri & Rao 1994, p. 16) 
The privatisation czar should be fully accountable to Parliament (and to the 
people) for the success of the privatisation, and will act as the liaison amongst 
Telkom and: Parliament, the public, prospective investors, and advisors and 
merchant bankers working on the project. The privatisation czar and his or her 
staff will also supervise the re-organisation and capitalisation of the divided 
Telkom units prior to their sale. 
The person chosen as privatisation czar must be "widely respected in both the 
public and private sectors, of high integrity, and having effective communications 
skills." (Durchslag, Puri & Rao 1994, p. 16) He or she should also have 
considerable executive authority, an adequate staff and operating budget, and 
direct access to decision makers at the highest levels of government. It is critical 




be protected as much as possible from pressure to favor any particular economic 
or political group during the proceedings. 
E~hanced Competition 
Steps 2, 3 and 4 of the legislative changes will spur competitive behavior, as 
entrepreneurs and foreign competitors are allowed to enter manufacturing and 
service provision markets. These steps should also spur competitive reaction from 
Telkom and from its suppliers, as they respond to a newly competitive market. 
Steps 2, 3 and 4 are also likely to be the most politically contentious ones. Policies 
of maximum transparency, broad consultation and full disclosure are likely to 
return their greatest benefits in this stage of the process. Moreover, in order for 
these steps to pass Parliament, substantial popular support will already have to 
have been generated through good public relations. 
Regulatory Construct · 
Step 5 requires action at. regional and national levels. Ideally, regulatory oversight 
of TROCs will occur at local/regionai levels, and will be highly adaptive to the 
competitive environment and technological sophistication prevailing in local 
markets. In establishing the new regulatory regime, the emphasis should be 
placed on increasing the intensity of competition in all aspects of the telecomms 
industry. Aggressive regulatory agencies (such as OFTEL in the U.K.) are 
"essential to ensure that improvement through competition develops 
cumulatively over time." (Beauman 1989, p. 223) 
It must be emphasised that the regulatory agency's primary function will be to 
promote competition, rather than to exercise direct control over the telecomms 
industry. Incumbent producers would be required to justify their strategic 
decisions on the basis of their effect on competition, and, the agency must be 
eternally vigilant for evidence of anti-competitive behavior. Moreover, the agency 
should create actively an environment in which competition can flourish, by 
continually eliminating anti-competitive regulation and supporting the efforts of 




Federal oversight should largely be limited to inter-regional and international 
services, as well as cellular services. Federal regulation can be enforced by an 
expanded and empowered Department of Posts and Telecommunications (or the 
newly formed ITA) 34 
Most of the TROCs, can be expected to retain significant market power in the 
medium term, so their regulation is particularly important. 35 Other Telkom units 
which are not likely to enjoy significant market power should be left largely 
unregulated except for normal corporate and securities oversight. 
5.2 Intra-unit Organisational and Financial Restructuring 36 
Under the direction of the privatisation czar, the organisational restructuring 
described in Section 4.1 must be undertaken with due haste. Ideally, Telkom 
would be divided into its long-distance (Telkom LD), TROCs, cellular, research 
(TDI) and other operating units. As noted above, the TROCs are likely to be 
divided on the same regional bases currently used for internal management by 
Telkom. 
Organisational Restructuring 
Each of the separate operating units would be separately incorporated, and should 
constitute separate (independent) boards of directors and senior management 
structures. At the time of division, the So1:1th African government would continue 
to own 100% of the equity in each unit. 
The division (or unbundling) process should include clear delineation of the rights 
and responsibilities incumbent upon each business unit and their relationships 
with respect to other industry participants. These rights and responsibilities are 
34 A major problem with the existing Telkom structure is that the vestigial DPT has been left with a highly 
ambiguous regulatory role. Parliament must clarify this role and fund its professional execution. 
35 Regulation of local telecomms service is likely to be based on some formula which limits Return on Assets. 
A system similar to the (RPI-x) formula which is used in the U.K. for regulating price increases in regulated 
services is probably most appropriate. 
36 The following discussion of restructuring summarises, in part, the lessons of telecomms privatisations in 
Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Chile, and the U.K. Sources for these lessons include: Nankani 1988, Jones, Tandon and 




particularly important in the areas of line access and pricing. The units must also 
set up structures to ensure continuing cooperation on technological standards and 
r~solution of disputes. 
;a 
Financial Restructuring 
After Telkom is divided into business units, historical income statements, balance 
sheets and eash flow statements will be prepared for each of the newly 
independent operations. Inevitably this will be a messy process, but the goal 
should be to prepare historical records which best represent the expected future 
condition of the business. These statements need to be reconstructed from pre-
division (i.e., consolidated) results, and should be fully audited by independent 
accountancy firms. Inherent in this process will be the (perhaps painful) necessity 
of marking all assets to their market values, and assessing their profit-making 
potential going forward. 
Under the direction of the privatisation czar, each of the Telkom units should be 
adequately capitalised prior to their sale or flotation on the equity markets. Levels 
of capitalisation adequacy can be determined through internal analysis and by 
comparison with similar entities in foreign countries. For units which are 
substantially undercapitalised, financial support from government may be 
required, or an equalisation between over- and under-funded units may occur at 
the discretion of the privatisation czar. 
Strategic Planning 
Prior to privatisation, each unit must be prepared for sale. This process will 
include, at least the following steps: 
• comprehensive strategic planning 
• rationalisation of management, labour and physical capital resources; 
• development of marketing and sales plans; 
• negotiation of long-term contracts 
• selection of corporate and capitalisation structures 
Within an organisation which has been run as conservatively as Telkom, 




political clout of the privatisation czar, and his or her backing at the highest levels 
of government, may be sorely tested. It is crucial that these changes are well-
planned, and executed quickly. If divisional managers are newly enabled to act on 
the behalf of their own business units, and if bureaucratic oversight is kept to a 
bare minimum (except by the privatisation czar and staff), the inherent difficulties 
of this process should be reduced. 
5.3 Setting Objectives for Privatisation 
After dividing Telkom into its operating components and restructuring the 
finances of each unit, separate decisions on the disposal of government's interest 
in each unit should be taken. Under the supervision of the privatisation 
champion, the objectives described in Section 3.2 can be operationalised and 
applied to each sale/ distribution decision. The main operational objectives to be 
considered include 37: 
OVERRIDING MANDATES 
• enhancement of competition 
• public acceptance and support 
• transparency 
PRIMARY OBJECTIVES 
• broad-based share ownership 
• technology transfer 
• increased capital investment 
SECONDARY OBJECTIVES 
• revenue maximisation 
• speed of transfer 
SPECIAL MANDATE 
• redistribution of wealth 
37 As in 5ection 3.1, some of these objectives contradict each other, or are even mutually exclusive. In 






For all aspects of the privatisation process, maximum transparency, general public 
acceptance and the enhancement of competition are crucial objectives, sine qua non. 
Tke credibility and feasibility of all future privatisation depends on adherence to 
plans which maximise on these three variables. Therefore the negotiations and 
transfers which lead to privatisation must be always open to public scrutiny and 
input. Moreover, all decisions should be "as objective as possible, with the criteria 
and their weighting clearly delineated." (Durchslag, Puri & Rao 1994, p. 15) 
Transparency and public acceptance do not require that the process should be 
delayed indefinitely in order to carry out consultations with all affected parties 
individually, nor to gain complete consensus on all issues. Forward momentum 




aggressively paced series of deadlines.38 The methodologies and results, 
particularly of valuation, should be fully disclosed. This need for complete 
disclosure extends to all regulatory decisions as well. 
Primary Objectives 
For Telkom LO, and for the TROCs, the most-important objectives include the 
transfer of technology and increased levels of capital investment. Therefore the 
emphasis should be on locating and obtaining bids from appropriate foreign 
investors. Social welfare would be best served in the long-term by finding 
appropriate strategic investors who are willing to lock up their investment capital 
for extended periods. 
In many cases the privatisation czar might make certain concessions to potential 
buyers, but these concessions should never be designed to result in decreased 
competition. The government should resist strenuously the urge to guarantee 
monopoly power of any kind to potential bidders, although these guarantees 
might increase their bidding prices. Government should also resist granting 
guarantees of profitability or growth: 
"Investors should bear the risk of the project's failure. The absence of risk 
removes the private sector's incentive to prevent failure." (Durchslag, Puri 
& Rao 1994, p. 16) 
For the smaller pieces of Telkom, technology transfer and investment objectives 
are not as important. For these units, the privatisation czar should attempt to 
maximise revenue and to complete the transactions as quickly and neatly as 
possible. Again, negotiations must be transparent, and must be undertaken 
strictly in the context of enhancing competition. 
Secondary (negotiable) Objectives 
For most of the Telkom units, consideration should not be dominated by the 
maximisation of revenue nor speed of ownership transfer. The South African 
38 A strict time table would be included in the privatisation legislation, and should be adhered to under all 




government is not rigidly constrained by the need for cash inflow nor rapid action, 
and focusing on .these short-term objectives is likely to be to the detriment of long-
run development goals. To ensure that the necessary improvements in telecomms 
infrastructure occur, and that competition is generally enhanced, government 
should be willing to trade off some zero-period revenue to gain long-term benefits 
of the privatisation process. 
Special Mandate Part 1-Redistribution of Wealth 
What should be done with the money? Privatisation of SBEs presents a special 
opportunity for governments to effect change in their societies. The windfall 
revenues which are generated by monetising (or securitising) state-owned assets 
can be used to promote any social goal which would benefit from an infusion of 
cash. In a developing country, it is expected that a legitimate government will use 
the proceeds from privatisation to further the process of economic development. 
In the case of South Africa, a strong case can also be made that privatisation 
proceeds should be used to redistribute wealth. 
Case for popular capitalism 
All in, the privatisation of Telkom can be expected to generate between R31 billion 
and R35 billion. (Fleming Martin, 1995). These funds should be used to increase 
social welfare for South Africans as much as possible, either by promoting long-
term economic development goals, reducing income inequality, or both. . 
When Iscor was privatised, the funds were used to retire government debt, to 
fund the formation of small business, and to create the Independent Development 
Trust. It was implicitly believed that the goals of society could best be met by 
pooling the financial capital from the Iscor privatisation, and applying it to 
development problems on a top-down, centrally planned basis. 
If the developmental needs of South African society were concentrated in areas in 
which there is a substantial risk of market failure (e.g., transportation or 




market failure (in those cases a public-goods problem), it is sensible for 
government to undertake projects itself for the greater good of all of the people. 
W}len pools of capital are accumulated for any public purpose, however, the 
• 
. likelihood for conflict between the desires of principals and the actions of agents is 
high. There appears to be a tradeoff in efficiency when developmental projects are 
undertaken o~ a massive scale, with a salaried cadre of implementors who control 
access to the capital. Some portion of the funds are almost inevitably lost to 
inefficiency and influence behavior. 
In the current environment in South Africa, the most pressing developmental 
needs will not be met by massive infrastructural projects. The greatest needs of 
poor South Africans are for houses and jobs, both of which (it can be argued) are 
created most efficiently on a decentralised, laisser-faire basis. By distributing the 
proceeds from Telkom's privatisation directly to the citizens of South Africa, the 
efficiencies of the market can best be putto work. There may be scope for pooling 
some small amounts of capital for. infrastructural purposes (particularly 
residential site & service and access roads), but generally speaking the impetus 
should be to distribute wealth. 
If individual households are entrusted to do what is in their own best interests, it 
is likely that the number of new dwellings built and the number of new jobs 
created from start-up ventures will be much greater than would occur if the 
money were administered by bureaucratic, centralised government structures. 
More important, in a society which has been long characterised by excessive 
government interference in the workings of the economy, many individual South 
Africans would welcome the opportunity to make their own investment and 
consumption decisions. Funding from other sources (including international aid) 
can be applied to the centralised development projects. The cash and ownership 
equity from the privatisation of Telkom would flow directly to those who will best 
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In addition to the economic arguments outlined above, popular capitalism has the 
benefit of political popularity. In gaining public acceptance of a privatisation plan, 
the prospect of immediate, and tangible, economic reward can be very persuasive. 
Citizens are more likely to support a privatisation plan which increases their 
economic well-being directly and immediately than a plan which promises to· 
improve their lives at some date in the future, and requires them to beleive in 
government's ability to choose appropriate means to make those improvements. 
5.4 Ownership Transfer - Stage One 
As discussed in Section 4.2, the optimal ownership structures of the various 
Telkom units depends on political and economic factors specific to each. In 
addition to factors affecting optimal outcome, the analysis which will determine 
the optimal privatisation technique should include: 
• expected size and complexity of transaction 
• expected sub-industry structure (e.g., oligopoly, monopolistic 
competition) 
• need for technology transfer 
• need for financial capital 
• need for management expertise 
Prior to Stage One, Telkom will have been thoroughly restructured, with its 
operating units divided into independent companies. Merchant bankers and 
specialist management consultants will have been hired to assist in drawing up a 
master plan for the privatisations. During Stage One it is envisioned that the 
government's stake in all major units of the former Telkom will be reduced to 
below 50%. The net cash which is received from the sale of these majority stakes 
would be deposited into a special trust account, and under no circumstances made 
available for general-fund government purposes. 
Telkom LD 
The majority stake in Telkom LD is likely to be auctioned off to strategic investors, · 
presumably from overseas. This sale will be conducted through a transparent, 




negotiate for some concessions from the purchaser, where those concessions are 
congruent with the overriding goals of the privatisation. For example, in 
e~change for an agreement by the purchaser not to sell shares for five years, the 
"' 
privatisation czar might be willing to accept a lower bid. 
TROCs 
The ownership of the TROCs is the most problematic aspect of Stage One. The 
TROCs are most likely to require ongoing regulation and the rigid enforcement of 
structures which enhance competition. The TROCs will also require great 
amounts of capital investment and technology transfer. Sale of controlling interest 
in the TROCs to foreign strategic investors is likely to make economic sense, but 
. may be politically unpopular. This unpopularity will be heightened if the same 
foreign company or consortium ends up buying Telkom LD and one or more 
TROC. Adequate, credible and equitable regulation, (with particular emphasis on 
the prevention of anti-competitive behavior) is of paramount importance in 
making the sale of the TROCs successful. 
Cellular and Other Investments 
For businesses which are not 100% owned by Telkom, some arrangement will 
have to be negotiated with the other owners. Pending the long.;.term re-
organisation of the national cellular duopoly, the privatisation czar may simply 
agree to sell Telkom's share in Vodacom to the remaining partners (Vodaphone 
and Rembrandt Group). Otherwise, a dedicated holding company may be created 
to own the assets of the former Telkom's investment, and that holding company 
could be sold to financial or strategic investors, or could be floated on the equity 
markets in Stage Two of the privatisation process. 
Non-cellular joint ventures and investments (e.g., Q-Trunk) could be disposed of 
in a fashion similar to that used for the cellular properties. If a complete 
separation is not economically feasible, Telkom's stakes in a number of small 
ventures could be consolidated under the authority of a single holding company, 





Manufacturing and other highly competitive smaller units will be sold outright on 
a private-sale basis, to domestic or foreign investors. The cash raised from these 
s~les will also be escrowed in the special trust account, and will not be available 
for general government purposes. 
Conclusion of Stage One 
At the conclusion of Stage One, the majority of Telkom LD will be owned by a 
strategic investor, with the minority continuing to be held by government. The 
individual TROCs will also be majority-owned by strategic investors, again with 
government retaining minority stakes. Cellular, manufacturing and other smaller 
subsidiaries will have been auctioned off to the highest bidders. All cash revenues 
from all transactions will be escrowed into a special trust account. 
5.5 Ownership Transfer - Stage Two 
As noted in Section 4.1, in the long term there is no reason for the South African 
government to own equity shares in any of the Telkom pieces. Stages Two and· 
Three provide the means for government to complete its divestment and to 
distribute the value of these shares to its citizens. 
Stage Two creates a market for the shares in Telkom LD and in the TROCs by 




equity investors. 39 The easiest means for accomplishing this is to float the shares 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). For Telkom LD and the larger TROCs, 
the value of government's shares may be high enough to warrant equity offerings 
on overseas markets (presumably London and New York) as well as on the JSE. 
In all cases the shares should be auctioned off in a competitive bidding process, 
rather than being sold at a fixed price (below market value) and subscribed to by 
lottery. A competitive auction ensures that maximum revenues will be generated 
from the sales, and that the distribution process is maximally transparent. As with 
the bloc sales of equity to strategic investors, and the private sales of smaller units, 
the cash proceeds from public equity offerings will be escrowed into a trust 
account. 
Completion of Stage Two 
At the completion of Stage Two, Telkom LO and the TROCs would continue to be 
majority-owned by strategic investors. Half of each of the minority stakes will be 
publicly traded on the JSE and/ or foreign exchanges, and the remaining halves 
will continue to be owned by the South African government. 
5.6 Ownership Transfer - Stage Three 
Stages One and Two will have divested most of the government's holdings in 
Telkom entities, and will have created a substantial trust account. A liquid market 
for shares in the Telkom units would exist on the JSE and foreign stock exchanges. 
In Stage Three, the remaining government-owned shares and the trust-account 
cash are distributed in a bundle to all resident citizens of South Africa on a per-
capita basis. 
Similar to the voucher privatisation schemes employed in the Czech Republic, 
each man, woman and child citizen of South Africa will be eligible to register for is 
or her distribution of shares and cash. 40 After establishing identity and residency, 
39 The strategic investors which bought control in Stage One will be able, of course, to increase their equity 
holdings in Stage Two, but must bid for their shares on a non-preferential basis. 





each citizen would receive a bundled distribution of trust-account cash and equity 
in the publicly traded Telkom LO and TROCs. 
The rationale for distributing cash and some owners' equity to the populace is 
grounded largely in the argument presented at the end of Section 5.3. For the 
specific developmental needs of South Africa in 1995, there does not appear to be 
a high risk of market failure, but the risk of non-market failure is significant. By 
distributing the value of Telkom very broadly, the decentralised allocation 
processes of the market appear likely to provide more social welfare than a top-
down imposition of large-scale projects. 
Per-capita rationale 
The rationale for making the distribution on a per-capita basis (as opposed to a 
targeted wealth transfer on a means-tested basis) is not as straightforward. If the 
sole objective of the distribution is to decrease inequality in the distribution of 
wealth, a means-tested distribution will clearly be more effective. Moreover, from 
a social welfare perspective, it can be argued that the money should be transferred 
to those citizens who will derive the greatest marginal utility from the additional 
mcome. presumably these people would be amongst the poorer citizens of South 
Africa. 
The primary reason for distributing on a per-capita basis instead of a means-tested 
basis is simplicity. Cash transaction costs will increase dramatically if it becomes 
necessary to determine the net worth of applicants as they register to receive their 
shares. Moreover, the additional complications and waiting period would be 
likely to deter many people from registering at all. The ability to gather census-
type information from virtually all members of society would also be lost if only 
some citizens were deemed eligible for distribution of shares and cash. An 
intangible sense of "fairness" would also be engendered by the per-capita 
distribution: no preferences on the basis of race, income, gender, age, or tribal 
affiliation. Means testing would destroy this sense. Finally, the opportunity to 




ownership collectively, as a nation, may have some unexpected benefits in 
building a prosperous and unified nation. 
The benefits of simplicity, quality of information, perceived fairness, and 
(perhaps) nation building are compelling. A means-tested system of distribution 
would accomJ.?lish marginally more wealth redistribution, but it is not clear that 
the economic and social costs are worth bearing. 
Cash Component of the Distribution Bundle 
To prevent an overstimulation of the economy, the cash should be distributed to 
citizens in three equal tranches over the course of a twelve-month period. Clearly 
there will be a number of logistical and security issues to be worked out (see the 
discussion of transaction costs below), but these must not deter government from 
spreading the wealth. 
Equity Component of the Distribution Bundle 
To prevent chaotic volatility in share. prices, the equity shares should also be 
distributed in three tranches over a twelve-month period. Effectively the shares 
will be semi-transferable at issue, and will vest into full salability over the course 
of their first year in existence. Relaxation of some JSE rules on brokerage accounts 
will be appropriate to facilitate the sale and/ or pooling of shares. 
Transaction Costs 
Registering nearly 40 million people, and distributing equity certificates and large 
sums of c~sh will clearly involve significant transaction costs. 41 The expenses of 
the distribution (as well as the fees of merchant bankers and management 
consultants) can be paid legitimately from the trust account, although these 
expenditures need to be closely monitored. 
41 Despite the daunting logistical problems, popular privatisations of this type have been executed 
successfully in many Eastern European countries, particularly Poland, the Czech Republic, and the former 
Soviet Union. 




An attractive benefit of the Stage Three distribution process will be that accurate 
data on South Africa's population, residency and other rudimentary facts can be 
gathered as part of the per-capita distribution. 42 Also, having undertaken the 
expenses of registering the entire population once, if subsequent privatisations of 
SBEs employ a popular distribution, the repeat process will be considerably less 
expensive 
Conclusion of Stage Three 
At the end of Stage Three, the government's ownership of Telkom entities will be 
completely divested. Telkom LD and the TROCs will continue to be controlled by 
strategic investors, with the market value of those stakes established by the 
publicly traded shares. The remaining equity and trust-account cash will have 
been distributed on a per-capita basis, providing further stimulus to a 
consumption-driven macroeconomic recovery. 
5.7 Regulatory Control 
After the ownership transfer is complete, the ongoing role of the government will 
be to provide a regulatory environment which is conducive to maximum 
competition and allocative efficiency. The primary means for achieving this goal 
will be: 
• mandatory (but compensated) equal access to monopolisable assets; 
• continuous encouragement to developers of competing telecomms 
networks and services; 
• explicit encouragement of discriminatory (marginal-cost) pricing in all 
markets with presence of monopoly power; 
• steadfast enforcement of the regulations against anti-competitive 
behavior of any kind. 
In long-distance services, it can be expected that Transtel (the Transnet network) 
will quickly provide a viable competitive option to Telkom LD. Investment in 
upgrading Transtel should be explicitly encouraged through tax incentives or 
42 This information will be extremely valuable to private-sector marketers. Much of the basic information 





other means. Additional competitors can be expected to enter the industry over 
time, particularly as technology provides the opportunity to leapfrog some of 
T~lkom LD's antiquated network assets . .. 
At the TROC and cellular levels, the regulating bodies must be highly vigilant in 
the short and medium terms. Scope for monopoly abuses can be expected to 
persist for the- foreseeable future, so the primary role of the regulators must be to 
heighten competition wherever possible. The regulators. must also continue to 
focus on furthering the goals of the optimal telecomms system as described in 
Section 3.1. These goals, including universal access, marginal-cost pricing and 
technological improvement, can be explicitly encouraged through targeted tax 
relief or tax burden, and through targeted regulatory provisions. 
One critical element of the regulatory regime and of South African industrial 
policy as a whole must be to maximise the free flow of technology, investment and 
capital goods into the country. Rapid technological improvements, and the 
economic benefits which are certain to· result, can best be accomplished through 
unimpeded trade and ownership relationships across national boundaries. 
5.8 Conclusion 
The privatisation plan outlined in this chapter is both practicable and equitable, 
focused on the goals set out in Section 3.1. A transparent, democratic process 
within these broad parameters can be certain to win maximum popular approval. 
This popular approval will remove many of the political difficulties which might 
otherwise slow the process. 
Widespread acceptance of this privatisation proposal by the financial community 
and the populace at large is predicated on the appointment of a privatisation czar 
and the employment of effective public-relations techniques. As long as honesty, 
integrity and the flow of information abound, the economic benefits of the 
restructuring should take care of themselves. 




South Africa has a unique opportunity to further its economic development by 
optimising its telecommunications industry. The current industry structure of 
state monopoly has outlived its usefulness, and the potential gains from 
competition and privatisation are substantial. 
The value of these changes in other countries at comparable levels of development 
is evidenced by the summary results in Table 4. 











Majority stakes sold to foreign $1,244 
strategic investors; remaining 45% 
sold to employees and local 
investors 
Majority sold to foreign investor, $170 
remainder floated and sold to 
employees 
Sold to investors in IPO $861 
Majority stake sold to consortium $1,760 
of foreign investors; remainder 
floated in Mexico, New York and 
Europe 
Sources: Durchslag & Puri (1993); Kikeri, Nellis & Shirley (1992) 
Result 
Improved performance and 
efficiency, increased network 
penetration 
Access lines increased 72%, full 
demand will be met in 1996, 
fully automated network, >66% 
digitised 
Productivity increased 50% in 3 
years; backlog for new 
installations eliminated 
Market valuation increased Sx; 
backlog cut; penetration 
increased substantially; service 
improved 
The optimisation of South African telecommunications requires a two-pronged 
approach: maximisation of industrywide competition and rewstructuring and 
ownership transfer of Telkom. Making the industry more competitive would be 
relatively easy. Technological advancements have removed most of the economic 
factors which used to result in natural monopoly. Simply by clearing the 





The restructuring and sale of Telkom would be substantially more complicated. 
In order to maximise the benefits from sale (broadly defined to include technology 
tr~nsfer and extension of service, as well as zero-period revenues), it makes sense 
;a 
to break Telkom into smaller strategic components, based on geography or 
function. The specific circumstances and developmental needs of each individual 
Telkom unit ~ould determine the optimal means for its disposition. 
South Africa has a unique opportunity to improve its economy, redistribute 
wealth, and send a powerful signal of fiscal sophistication to the world. Through 
the restructuring of its telecommunications industry South Africa can herald the 
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